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ABSTRACT 
 The weaponization of networked technology is a political tool—still in its infancy—
that exists between the realms of hard and soft power. This allows nation-states to achieve 
strategic objectives without breaking the threshold of an act of war. State sponsored cyber 
operations are a more aggressive political tool than soft power but not as aggressive as hard 
power and armed force in most instances. Proper utilization of cyber tools and cyber 
deterrence can achieve tangible strategic goals that otherwise would only be attainable 
through physical warfare. This thesis will demonstrate how Russia and China as revisionist 
powers have successfully utilized cyber in this way, ushering in a new period of nation-state 
rivalry.
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 It is no secret that computers are a defining and ubiquitous aspect of human culture in 
the 21st century. Nearly all aspects of everyday life involve using a device that contains both 
a microchip and a networked communication channel to at least one other device, if not the 
internet as a whole. Most forms of communication between individuals, organizations, and 
governments are conducted via digital networks—email, Voice over Internet Protocol (VOIP) 
phones, Military Internet Relay Chat (MIRC), etc. Networked technology is the medium of 
nearly all communications for government functions from political rallies to tactical combat 
communications. Beyond communication, an increasingly significant amount of financial 
transactions, goods, services, education, and information exchange are conducted online.  1
From AirB&B to Facebook, IBM agricultural cloud services to the Supervisory Control and 
Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems that manage the US power grid and nuclear reactors, the 
internet is no longer simply a luxury for most modern societies and cultures. It is quickly 
becoming as fundamental and necessary as roads, plumbing, and electricity.  2
 With technology and invention being a fundamental part of human existence, it has 
always contributed to inter-state competition throughout history. With the invention of air 
travel, so began the militarization of aircraft and their use in warfare. When society became 
dependent on fossil fuels after the industrial revolution, oil became a leveraging tool between 
!  Schmidt, Eric & Cohen, Jared The New Digital Age: Transforming Nations, Businesses, 1
and our Lives (New York, New York: Vintage Books, March 2014).
!  Scott, Laurence The Four-Dimensional Human: Ways of Being in the Digital World 2
(London, England: Random House, 2015).
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states. In more recent history, nuclear energy and weapons became the focal point of 
competition and geopolitical deterrence. States have used tools at their disposal along a 
spectrum of hard and soft power to achieve goals that benefit their respective populations. 
The internet and the world’s reliance on networked technology is no different. 
 This thesis will argue that cyber operations as an international political tool falls 
between the realm of soft and hard power and has become the premier tool within a “gray 
zone” that allows “revisionist powers” to compete without resorting to open warfare.  
 First, what is a “Revisionist Power” and what is the “Gray Zone?” According to the 
Institute for the Study of War, revisionist powers “…seek to revise the current global order to 
their advantage, increasing their regional and global influence while decreasing that of the 
United States and its allies and partners.”  The United States has publicly made known that 3
Russia and China are both the premier revisionist powers along with Iran. One of the main 
methods of seeking the revisionist’s goal stated above is through what is called “gray zone” 
operations. 
 The Institute for the Study of War defines the “gray zone” as “…the hostile or 
adversarial interactions among competing actors below the threshold of conventional war and 
above the threshold of peaceful competition.”  The gray zone is not a new area of 4
competition nor are cyber operations the only gray zone tool that states use. States who desire 
!  Dubik, James, Lt Gen, (U.S. Army, Ret.) & Vincent, Nic "America’s Global Competitions: 3
The Gray Zone in Context,” Institute for the Study of War, (February 2018). 
!  Ibid4
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to change the global status quo without breaking the threshold of war (ie. revisionist powers), 
use the gray zone to influence their competitors aggressively. 
 The reason gray zone operations are successful is because they fall under the broader 
category of coercion. The essence of a gray zone action is commit an action that is small 
enough for the victim state to decide that the cost of retaliation is not worth it. This allows 
the antagonizing nation to commit acts that benefit them while not worrying about 
repercussions. These small acts that fall below the threshold of physical retaliation will then 
build up until a significant strategic objective is accomplished. By the time the victim state 
realizes the pattern and what the strategic goals of the antagonizing state are, it is too late to 
mount an effective response.  5
 An essential part of gray zone operations is ensuring the victim state does not realize 
the true strategic goals of the attacking state until it is too late. If the victim state realizes the 
attacker’s broader strategic objectives right away, they are more likely to put a stop to it 
early. Russia heavily uses a deniability concept called reflexive control to further cloud the 
truth behind their true motives—helping to mask their gray zone objectives. Again looking at 
the Institute for the Study of War, “Reflexive control causes a stronger adversary to 
voluntarily choose the actions most advantageous to Russian objectives by shaping the 
adversary’s perceptions of the situation decisively.”   6
!  Dubik, James, Lt Gen, (U.S. Army, Ret.) & Vincent, Nic "America’s Global Competitions: 5
The Gray Zone in Context,” Institute for the Study of War, (February 2018). 
!  Snegovaya, Maria "Putin's Information Warfare in Ukraine,” Institute for the Study of War, 6
(September 2015).
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 Russia has a historical reputation for publicly claiming one goal for their actions 
while an alternative goal goes unnoticed. They attempt to alter the perception of the opposing 
state in order to influence their decision making. This is a perfect method of operations for 
successful gray zone actions. Reflexive control historically causes enough ambiguity to slow 
down or entirely prevent retaliation by other states. When reflexive control is not enough, 
they resort to full deniability to hide their intentions. 
 Russia and China both are experts at gray zone operations. Russia has effectively 
been increasing their sphere of influence in Ukraine, Georgia, Syria, and the Arctic Ocean’s 
Northern Sea Route by committing small acts masked by reflexive control. In most of these 
cases, the Russians use proxy military groups to further cloud the waters and generally make 
the situation messier to prevent anyone from attempting to retaliate. While China does not 
use altered perception tactics as heavily as Russia, they have still utilized the gray zone to 
slowly start gaining control of the South China Sea (SCS). Similar to Russia’s operations in 
the Arctic, China has started placing military assets in the SCS and has even started building 
islands to sustain their military presence despite protests from other states. The reason these 
actions are successful is because each individual action is small enough to either go missed 
or not warrant the full attention of a state that has the capability to stop them (such as the 
United States). 
 How do cyber operations fit within the concept of the gray zone? Just like any toolkit, 
having a diverse set of options to pick from enables one to achieve a more accurate and 
precise result. Each tool has certain capabilities and limitations. For certain situations, 
!4
specific soft power tools are more suited to achieve a desired goal. Other times, military 
action or hard power may be more appropriate, but a carpenter cannot build a house using 
solely a hammer and negotiation skills. Other tools become necessary in order to achieve 
desired results.  
 Due to the widespread proliferation and dependence of networked technology, 
“cyber” has become another gray zone tool in the international relations toolkit. What makes 
networked technology unique, however, is that cyber operations answer a unique question in 
interstate rivalry that has developed in the post-Cold War era amidst the emergence of 
revisionist powers. That question is, “When traditional soft power is not enough, how can a 
nation win objectives against a major state power that possesses military overmatch?”  
 To answer this question, both Russia and China have found trademark ways to utilize 
the world’s dependance on networked technology and the internet. China primarily has used 
data theft while Russia has learned to use cyber information warfare operations—sometimes 
even tied with physical military (or, paramilitary) action. 
 Due to the relatively cheap cost of cyber operations, smaller nations and even non-
state actors have also taken advantage of the cyber warfare tool. North Korea’s hack on Sony 
Entertainment  and subsequent threats to US movie theaters for showing an anti-DPRK film 7
resulted in temporary disruption of freedom of speech—several theaters refused to show the 
film out of fear. Iran has a history of cyber attacks against oil competitors like Saudi Arabia, 
!  Segal, Adam The Hacked World Order: How Nations Fight, Trade, Maneuver, and 7
Manipulate in the Digital Age (New York, New York: Public Affairs, February 2016).
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and ISIS and other Islamic extremists have effectively utilized social media and mis-
information operations to spread ideology and fear. While these smaller cyber threats exist, 
this thesis will primarily focus on China and Russia through the context of revisionist powers 
developing cyber tactics for use against the US.  
 While cyber operations are more aggressive than soft power it has   limitations. When 
used on its own, cyber operations will not—in the foreseeable future—become equivalent to 
hard power. They will not cause the same level of damage as hard power nor will cyber 
attacks receive the same level of international response as hard, physical military action. One 
of the goals of this thesis is to capture both the capabilities and limitations of cyber 
operations—showing their usefulness as a gray zone tool. 
 These capabilities and limitations will then be demonstrated and analyzed using 
historical examples. These examples will be used to capture the tactics, techniques, and 
procedures (TTPs) that revisionist powers have developed to maximize cyber use’s 
capabilities while minimizing its limitations to achieve strategic goals. These examples will 
demonstrate that—contrary to public belief and fear—cyber “wars” will not be fought with 
the same destruction and violence as traditional physical conflict. Cyber operations will play 
a part in future  conflict but, on its own, cyber is best used below the threshold of physical 
armed conflict.   
 This analysis will look at cyber operations in three ways. First, how societies use 
cyber capability will be explored. This section examines how integral networked technology 
has become to everyday societies. This aspect of the analysis is important because the utility 
!6
of state cyber operations is directly proportional its use in society. In other words, a state 
cannot use cyber operations effectively against a competing nation if the society of that 
nation does not rely on computers. For example, North Korea has plenty of critical targets 
within the US to conduct a cyber attack, whereas a US cyber attack on the DPRK would have 
a more limited effect—North Korea does not rely on the internet to control its electricity or 
water supply.  
 The second aspect of cyber use to be analyzed are the technical properties and 
characteristics of the cyber realm. This includes advantages and limitations of cyber use such 
as the difficulty of attribution, cost vs effect, the freedom of movement that cyber operations 
afford, and whether or not cyber operations qualify as “armed force” according to UN 
articles. This analysis will also break down the stages of a cyber attack and define both terms 
and the different types of cyber attacks. This will allow for a concise understanding of the 
fundamental characteristics of the cyber realm in order to understand what it can and cannot 
achieve.  
 This will lead to the third aspect of this analysis, the realm of geopolitics. This will be 
a look at historical examples of how Russia and China have used cyber operations to achieve 
geopolitical goals and how states might do so more effectively in the future. This third 
analysis will provide an insight into the two revisionist power’s tactics, techniques, and 




 Why is it necessary to examine state cyber operations as a political tool at all? There 
are two reasons. First, as this thesis will argue, cyber operations over the past decade have 
signaled a return of nation-state rivalry that has been out of the spotlight in recent years. 
After the terrorist acts of 2001 and on, the international focus from the West has been on 
counterterrorism. However, this same time period of terrorist acts and extremism has also 
been a period of computer network development behind the scenes. During the international 
focus on the Global War on Terror (GWOT), states learned to use information war and cyber 
operations to achieve international effects. Revisionist powers have already begun 
developing cyber tactics and have begun using this tool in the international sphere. If the 
international security mindset of the first two decades of the 21st century was focused on 
counterterrorism, the next decade (or more) will focus on the cyber security threat from 
foreign states. 
 The period between 2007 to 2018 saw significant cyber operations committed by 
several competing state powers. Russia has used cyber operations to cause disruption in 
Estonia and advanced their projection of military power through cyber attacks in Georgia and 
Ukraine.  During this same period, China has stolen military, industrial, and financial data 8
!  Segal, Adam The Hacked World Order: How Nations Fight, Trade, Maneuver, and 8
Manipulate in the Digital Age (New York, New York: Public Affairs, February 2016).
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through cyber espionage giving their industries a competitive advantage and employed cyber 
capability to conduct counterintelligence operations.  9
 This period saw how one state can use cyber and information operations to create 
fear, confusion, and uncertainty within a rival state. North Korea leveraged stolen data from 
entertainment company Sony and successfully convinced theaters across the US to obey 
North Korean demands, temporarily hurting the democratic value of freedom of speech  and 10
dictating whether or not theaters would play a certain political film. Russian groups have also 
manipulated the flow of information across the internet to alter domestic democratic 
processes in several countries,  causing turmoil within the US government and increased 11
mistrust among the US population. ISIS, a non-state actor, successfully used cyber operations 
to spread their extremist ideology, inciting attacks and fear. Not only did they maximize use 
of the cyber domain, but they also maximized the use of the media—tailoring their gruesome 
videos and acts in such a way as to guarantee widespread media coverage.  
 Possibly the pivotal cyber act of this decade was how the world witnessed the first 
cyber operation to result in physical destruction of infrastructure—called Stuxnet. This was 
!  Brown, Ian "Imagining a Cyber Surprise: How Might China Use Stolen OPM Records to 9
Target Trust,” War on the Rocks, May 2018, https://warontherocks.com/2018/05/imagining-
a-cyber-surprise-how-might-china-use-stolen-opm-records-to-target-trust/.
!  Segal, Adam The Hacked World Order: How Nations Fight, Trade, Maneuver, and 10
Manipulate in the Digital Age (New York, New York: Public Affairs, February 2016).
!  Jenkins, Tricia "What did the Russian Trolls Want During the 2016 Election: A Closer 11




an attack on a nuclear production facility in Natanz, Iran. The computer virus manipulated 
programmable logic controllers that managed nuclear centrifuge operation. The malicious 
code took advantage of several undiscovered exploits to order the centrifuges to operate 
beyond normal limits—thus destroying themselves. Nearly 1,000 centrifuges were destroyed 
and Iran’s nuclear production at that facility was cut by 20%.  Investigators found that the 12
virus had existed as early as 2005 and spent years proliferating thousands of computers 
around the globe, searching specifically for the hardware used in the Natanz facility before 
executing. While suspicion for the culprit of the attack has fallen on the US and Israel, 
neither nation has claimed responsibility for the attack. 
 Stuxnet was the first cyber attack to cause physical damage to a system. However, it 
is an outlier within the pattern of cyber attacks and how they’ve historically been used. Much 
like the World War II nuclear bombings in Japan, the Stuxnet attacks showed the world the 
level of damage that cyber attacks could do—and thus nations have been hesitant to use a 
weapon on that scale since. With the return of nation-state rivalries, the memory of Stuxnet 
reminds international players of the possibilities associated with cyber attacks. 
 The second reason why it is necessary to examine state cyber operations is because, 
as this thesis will argue, geopolitics is the main limiter on what cyber operations will be able 
to accomplish, not the technical cyber capabilities themselves. In other words, even if nations 
were to devise ways to bring about severe physical damage to a competing state’s 
12 Segal, Adam The Hacked World Order: How Nations Fight, Trade, Maneuver, and 
Manipulate in the Digital Age (New York, New York: Public Affairs, February 2016). 
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infrastructure while being able to completely conceal evidence or proof, geopolitics and 
international relations theory will still limit cyber weapons’ usage. For example, nations 
today have the capability to invade their neighbors and wage large scale wars to solve 
geopolitical problems. However, they do not immediately resort to that tactic because 
geopolitics and international relations drive their decision making.  As Kaplan argues, 13
technology does not make geography irrelevant. In fact, technology and the speed at which 
nations can interact around the world makes knowledge of the geography that drives national 
strategy all the more important. A return to nation state rivalry means a necessary return to 
examining what drives a nation’s political objectives, because this will shape how that nation 
uses tools such as cyber operations. 
!  Kaplan, Robert The Revenge of Geography (New York, New York: Random House, 13
2013). 
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PART ONE: SOCIETY’S CURRENT DEPENDENCE ON TECHNOLOGY  
 The first aspect of cyber operations to be analyzed in this thesis is society’s 
dependence on technology and how this effect cyber utility as a weapon. The more a nation 
relies on technology for critical needs, the more vulnerable it is to attack though 
manipulation or disruption of that technology. In a very simplified sense, the cyber realm is 
somewhat similar to the sea domain of military warfare in this way. A landlocked nation 
might not reap the benefits of having a deep sea port, but they are also less vulnerable to 
foreign naval invasion. An island nation may rely extensively on oceanic commerce, but this 
reliance on the waterways also makes them vulnerable to naval-based foreign actions against 
them. This does not mean they are helpless against naval attacks. If an island nation 
appreciates their dependence, they will take defensive measures to make this vulnerability a 
hard target. However, the mere fact of relying on the sea creates an inherent vulnerability that 
would not exist otherwise, no matter how strong ones defenses are. 
 The same goes for networked technology. A nation that fully utilizes technology is 
inherently more vulnerable to attacks from that domain. Estonia is a perfect example of this. 
Their heavy cyber dependence for many government functions made them especially 
vulnerable to Russian attack, which will be examined in this thesis. Much like how a naval-
based nation will appreciate their reliance on the sea and take defensive action to shore up 
their vulnerabilities, a cyber-dependent nation can do the same—creating redundancies in 
communication lines and backup servers to minimize single points of failure in critical 
!12
technologies. However well defended a nation’s cyber infrastructure is, though, it is still 
more vulnerable to cyber based attack than a nation that is not reliant on technology. 
 As of January 2019, there are estimated to be over 17 billion networked devices 
around the world. According to the International Telecommunications Union, over 48% of 
the world population has internet connectivity through some device every month of the 
year.  This includes 41% of the developing world population and 81% of the developed 14
world. Compare this to 2005 when only 16% of the world population was connected, 8% of 
the developing world, and only 51% of the developed world.   15
 By pure percentage, smaller developed countries have the highest rate of connected 
device saturation (number of residents having regular internet access compared to population 
number) with nations like the Falkland Islands, Iceland, and Liechtenstein nearing 100%. 
Looking beyond these small, developed countries, over 50 nations have a higher than 75% 
rate of connectivity for their populations as of 2017—with the US taking the number 54 spot 
at 76% right behind Russia with 76.4%. China in 2017 ranked in the 109th position with a 
53% rate of internet connectivity.  16
 This rate of growth is only expected to increase as basic networked technologies 
become smaller, cheaper, and more proliferated across different industries and markets. 
Minicomputers, such as the RasperryPi, are only helping speed up the process, allowing users 





with only a basic knowledge of computing to build their own “Internet Of Things” (IoT) 
connected devices for less than $40 USD. Everything from house lights to vehicles to 
children’s stuffed animals are getting connected to the internet. The immediate threat of 
proliferated IoT devices such as these may not be immediately evident. The vulnerabilities 
that the IoT movement poses will be discussed shortly. 
 What are these populations doing with so many connected devices? After all, quantity 
of a resource does not necessarily equal vulnerability if the population is not dependent on it. 
A few main aspects of society where technology has become integral are news and 
communications, public utilities, and data based decision making. 
News and Communications 
 According to a study conducted by the Pew research center, two-thirds of Americans 
receive their news from social media. Of that number, 45% specifically listed Facebook 
among their main news sources. Of that 45%, half stated that they use Facebook as their one 
and only source of news—not using any other outlet to be informed.   17
 It should be noted that this survey was conducted with a sample size of 4,971 
Americans.  However, the results of the study are consistent with a larger joint survey and 18
data analysis done by the Swiss National Bank, Reuters, and Columbia University that 
!  Shearer, Elisa & Gottfried, Jeffrey “News Use Across Social Media Platforms 2017,” Pew 17




included 72,000 participants in 36 countries.  This report specifically highlighted Facebook 19
among social media platforms as a predominant source of news information for most people 
globally. One major limitation of this survey is that they were conducted online, so there is an 
inherent bias towards people who are already using the internet regularly. However, with the 
number of connected users nearing 81% of the developed world as seen by the ITU, it is 
reasonable to say that the survey results are representative of the high majority of the 
developed world’s population. 
 In addition to news propagation, governments are increasingly relying on internet and 
social media platforms to communicate and conduct services with their constituents. Taxes 
and other services are conducted primarily online. Local governments use Twitter and 
Facebook to quickly disseminate information and receive feedback from the people. 
 Even outside the government, the internet is the primary medium of communication 
for the general population. A different Reuters poll demonstrated that 85% of connected users 
rely on internet communications such as email on a daily basis.  10% of all retail sales in the 20
US were conducted online in 2017.  According to Google CEO Eric Schmidt and former 21
Secretary of State Policy Planning Staff member Jared Cohen, the internet will soon become 
!  Kennedy, Patrick & Prat, Andrea “Where Do People Get Their News?” in 67th Economic 19
Policy Panel Meeting, (Zurich, Switzerland: Swiss National Bank, April 2018). 
!  Shearer, Elisa & Gottfried, Jeffrey “News Use Across Social Media Platforms 2017,” Pew 20
Research Center, September 2017, http://www.journalism.org/2017/09/07/news-use-across-
social-media-platforms-2017/.
!  Statista, “E-commerce Share of Total Retail Sales in United States From 2013 to 2021,” 21
https://www.statista.com/statistics/379112/e-commerce-share-of-retail-sales-in-us/.
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the primary means of commerce, communication, and even employment as more work and 
service can be done online without a physical presence.   22
Energy and Utility Control 
 Moving beyond news and information consumption, the internet is also being used to 
control and monitor critical services such as energy, water, and other utilities. This is done 
using supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems, smart grids, and smart 
sensors. SCADA systems are software based systems that are used to monitor and regulate 
infrastructure such as power grids, water supplies, nuclear reactors, etc. These computer 
programs electronically control physical machinery like pumps, motors, pipeline control 
flow, and more.  
 When SCADA systems were first introduced, they were often isolated from the public 
internet, running on a closed network. This separation made it difficult to install system 
updates and remotely monitor operations so, more of these SCADA systems are being 
networked to either an industrial intranet or the even the public internet. 
 Smart grids, smart sensors, and smart metering are similar to SCADA. According to 
Symantec, these internet connected components allow utility companies to more accurately 
and remotely measure energy consumption and provide more minute data to provide robust 
analysis of flow patterns. This helps give utility companies a better picture of how, when, and 
!  Schmidt, Eric & Cohen, Jared The New Digital Age: Transforming Nations, Businesses, 22
and our Lives (New York, New York: Vintage Books, March 2014).
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where energy is being used. Symantec predicts that billions of internet connected sensors and 
meters will be installed to create smart grids over the next decade.  23
Agriculture and AI Based Decision Making 
 Digitally networked sensors and the internet are being used in conjunction with 
Artificial Intelligence (AI) to collect data and provide granular analysis of large scale systems 
such as farming. One of the most foundational aspects of every state’s economy dating back 
to the dawn of civilization is agriculture. IBM has marketed their Watson supercomputer and  
cloud networking services to companies and industries to help inform their decision making 
with AI powered data analysis.  
 These complex factors make agriculture a market where advanced data analytics is 
highly useful.  A plethora of factors play a role in decisions such as what crops to grow, 
where to sow, when to harvest, and more. Everything from global economic changes, 
population growth, soil conditions, insect behavior, and air quality must be taken into 
account. Agricultural decisions must also be made with an appreciation for global climate 
change and its alteration of these aforementioned factors and historical patterns. Using the 
internet and smart sensors to collect data in conjunction with Watson’s advanced ability to 
analyze such large datasets and their interactions helps farmers to maximize crop yield.     24
!  Wueest, Candid “Targeted Attacks Against the Energy Sector,” Symantec, (13 Jan 2014).23
!  Mello, Ulisses & Raghavan, Sriram “Bringing the power of Watson to farmers,” IBM, 24
September 2018, https://www.ibm.com/blogs/research/2018/09/smarter-farms-agriculture/.
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 IBM has developed two suites of tools for agriculture industry to use—the Watson 
Decision Platform for Agriculture and Smart Rural —to provide decision making data based 25
on advanced AI analysis. This data comes both from publicly available information online as 
well as smart sensors that collect real-time data  such as sunlight, condensation, soil quality, 26
pest control, and drone imaging to conduct geographic surveys.  
 Agriculture is only one market where this advanced, AI-based quantitative 
information collection, analysis, and decision making is inserting itself into critical 
industries. IBM continues to advertise their services for markets around the world and, as 
more and more data becomes available through the proliferation of smart sensors and IoT 
devices, networked data-based decision making will undoubtedly become the norm for both 
developed and underdeveloped nations.  
The Vulnerabilities of Dependence 
 The more integral a technology becomes to a society, the more vulnerable they are to 
attacks through disruption of that technology. In world history, the advent of agriculture made 
civilizations vulnerable to influences on crop production. When a foreign power wanted to 
control a people group, they did it though crop yield. After the Industrial Revolution, that 
control came through oil and fuel as nations looked for ways to power their production, fuel 
their engines, and make profits selling those resources to other nations.  





 Now, as societies increasingly rely on the internet for critical industries such as news 
and communications, public utilities, and decision making for critical markets, networked 
technology is the new field of control and vulnerability. Internet-based news sources can be 
manipulated or even blocked out entirely. Communications can be disrupted, causing delays 
in government functions, financial transactions, or even ability to conduct one’s day to day 
job. Public utilities can be damaged or disabled, leaving populations without power, heat, or 
working water. Corruption or even theft of sensitive data in critical repositories and decision 
making engines can result in erroneous decision making or compromise of information that 
could be damaging to a company or government. These are all within the realm of possibility 
for a nation that is dependent on networked technology for daily living and critical services.  
 Even seemingly innocuous IoT devices such as internet controlled vehicles, 
televisions, and lightbulbs provide a vulnerability. Tests done by McAfee have caused 
cybersecurity experts to theorize on the possibility of brown-outs if an attacker were to gain 
access to the wifi-based lighting controls of a population. These experts posited that 
malicious code could be uploaded  onto a computer that is connected to the same local 
network as the wifi enabled lights. This could be done through an infected email or malicious 
advertisement. This malicious code would enable remote access to any wifi controlled lights 
on the network (the code to control these functions remotely already exists). If a threat agent 
gained access to enough lighting systems on a single section of a power grid, they could—in 
!19
theory—cause widespread power outages by activating each device they had access to at one 
time during peak hours.   27
 Similar techniques could be applied to any smart device. Smart televisions could be 
remotely manipulated to play a certain propaganda pieces, influential political ads, or maybe 
interfere with an official announcement such as the State of the Union address. Refrigerators 
could be powered off remotely to cause widespread food spoilage. When done to a single 
home or device, the damage is only a nuisance. However, when scaled to a city (malicious 
code is notoriously easy to spread across a network), mass spoilage of food could cause real 
concern. Hackers have already demonstrated the ability to remotely control a vehicles speed 
and braking using the internet.  It does not take any imagination to see the damage such an 28
attack like that would cause. 
 The above are all simply examples of what is within the realm of the possible when a 
nation is dependent on networked technology for critical services and infrastructure. Part 
three of this thesis will look in more detail at how cyber operations and the above 
vulnerabilities have actually been exploited by revisionist powers in the past decade. 
!  Siskind, Geoff "Hackable Podcast by McAfee,” McAfee, February 2019, https://27
hackablepodcast.com/.
!  Greenberg, Andy "Hackers Remotely Kill a Jeep on the Highway—With Me In It,” Wired, 28
July 2015, https://www.wired.com/2015/07/hackers-remotely-kill-jeep-highway/.
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PART TWO: CYBER TERMS, DEFINITIONS, AND TYPES OF ATTACKS 
 Before continuing on with an analysis of the unique characteristics of the cyber realm 
and how revisionist powers have used it, it is necessary to establish some basic terms and 
definitions. This section will define cyber warfare, cyber attack, break down the actual steps 
and methodology of a cyber attack, and define some of the more common types of cyber 
attacks that will be discussed throughout the rest of this thesis. 
  The definition of cyber warfare that this thesis will operate on is provided by Richard 
Stiennon in the book, Cyber Warfare: A Multidisciplinary Analysis, “Cyber warfare is an 
extension of policy by actions taken in cyberspace by state actors (or by non-state actors with 
significant state direct or support) that constitute a serious threat to another state’s security, or 
an action of the same nature taken in response to a serious threat to a state’s security (actual 
or perceived).”  29
Furthermore, a cyber attack is defined as: 
 “An electronic attack to a system, enterprise or individual that intends to disrupt, steal 
 or corrupt assets where those assets might be digital (such as data or information or a  
 user account), digital services (such as communications) or a physical asset with a  
 cyber component (such as the process control system found in a building, aircraft   
 or nuclear refinement facility). Typically such attacks seek to compromise the   
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 confidentiality, integrity or availability of digital assets, and so cyber security controls 
 seek to preserve these properties in some way.”  30
 Finally, the term “electronic” within the above definition refers to the use of energy to 
transmit information. This includes electronic data (computer code) that is sent across 
networks to conduct the attack.  31
Stages of a Cyber Attack 
 There are typically four stages to a cyber attack: reconnaissance, exploit delivery, 
payload injection, and iteration.  Reconnaissance is a necessary part of part of cyber attacks 32
in much the same way as it is in soft and hard power actions. Whereas a military targeteer 
uses known information on a facility to determine the type of munition used in bombing that 
target (construction material of the building, whether it is hardened, surrounding area, etc), 
the type of cyber attack used is typically suited to the specific hardware and software being 
used by the target. In other words, not every type of attack works against every type of 
network or computer. Additionally, the method of delivery must be analyzed (for example, 
can the malicious code be delivered via the internet or is there an “air gap” requiring the 
payload to be physically uploaded onto the local system or network) as well as other factors. 
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 In the case of social engineering (to be further defined in the next section) and 
misinformation operations, reconnaissance must also be done on the targeted individuals. 
Social engineering attacks such as spear-phishing (where the target receives an email 
containing false information designed to entice the target to disclose sensitive information 
such as bank numbers or passwords) have a higher chance of success when there is sufficient 
knowledge on the target to craft a convincing email.  
 An attacker must be careful when conducting reconnaissance not to raise too many 
flags that might tip off the defender to an impending cyber attack. A balance point must be 
made between gaining sufficient intelligence on the target and giving away one’s intentions. 
Additionally, if reconnaissance actions can be traced back to the attacker, then attribution is 
easier to determine when the attack is actually made.  33
 The second stage of a cyber attack is exploit delivery. This is where the actual cyber 
defenses of the target are compromised—creating a path or opening for the attacker to gain 
access the victim system or network. The tool or vulnerability that the attacker uses to gain 
access to a system is called the exploit. Exploits come in various forms from inexpensive, 
commercial off the shelf software tools to highly valuable “zero day” exploits—
vulnerabilities in a computer system that have yet to be patched or even discovered by the 
manufacturer or user.  34
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 Separate from the exploit delivery is the payload injection. While the exploit is the 
method of compromising the target’s cyber defenses and gaining access to their system, 
payload injection is the insertion of malicious script such as a program designed to corrupt 
data, spyware tools like keyloggers, or other types of viruses.   35
 Within the payload injection stage, some attacks may also be designed to have 
persistence while others may be designed to destroy themselves to prevent discovery. 
Persistence allows future access to the compromised system without having to repeat the 
exploit delivery stage of bypassing the target’s security. A payload can be designed to reside 
on the system and avoid detection and deletion in order to allow for indefinite access to the 
target system for attacker manipulation.  36
 The final stage of a cyber attack is iteration. This is what the malicious code does 
after it has been executed. A virus may be designed to allow remote access of the targeted 
system for an indefinite period. Some payloads may be designed with persistence to conduct 
further reconnaissance and map out the network it has infiltrated. Some other payloads may 
be designed to establish new avenues of exploitation to allow for easier future access. Still 
other payloads may be designed to reconfigure themselves in order to further exploit other 
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portions of the network in which it resides in order to deliver a second payload in another 
portion of the infected system.   37
 These four stages of a cyber attack: reconnaissance, exploit delivery, payload 
injection, and iteration, have been broken down in and incorporated into other attack models 
by different security firms such as Lockheed Martin’s  seven-step “Cyber Kill Chain.”  38
However, the above four stage process has been chosen in this thesis for its simplicity in 
order to provide a surface level understanding of cyber attack methodology. 
 Often the most difficult part of a cyber attack is the exploit delivery phase that grants 
access to the targeted system. Most tools and resources that hackers incorporate are used to 
gain initial access into a system. To conduct a successful exploit, there are six questions that 
a perpetrator must consider in deciding what type of tool he wants to use.  The 39
reconnaissance stage of a cyber attack helps the perpetrator to determine the answers to these 
questions: 
1. How targetable is the exploit? This is the ability of the attacker to target only the intended 
exploit. Similar to the idea of “collateral damage” in hard power and “unintended 
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consequences” in soft power, the ability to be as precise as possible in a cyber attack helps 
to ensure maximum efficiency and also keeps the fingerprint of the attack as light as 
possible to maximize covertness—if that is a desired attribute of the cyber attack.   40
2. How much control does the attacker have over the exploit? The controllability of an attack 
that is executed further enables the perpetrator to be precise in which systems are 
manipulated or which data gets wiped or stolen. If an attacker wants to steal a specific 
computer file at a firm but the only tool in his disposal is a malicious program that, once 
executed, steals all the data available on the compromised network, then the attacker has 
low controllability over the exploit and his chances of discovery are increased. Certain 
attacks may not require a significant amount of controllability depending on the goal of the 
attack.  41
3. How persistent is the exploit? There are two aspects to persistence. Persistence of the 
exploit and persistence of the payload. Persistence of the exploit refers to how long the 
targeted system can remain compromised before the defender is able to fix their cyber 
defenses. Persistence of the payload refers to how long the payload can remain on the 
system undetected and, if detected, how difficult it is to remove. If the defender simply 
needs to change his password in order to eliminate the attacker’s ability to access the target 
system, then the attack has low exploit persistence. If the payload is easily discovered and 
!  Hodges, Duncan & Screese, Sadie "Understanding Cyber-Attacks,” in Cyber Warfare: A 40




can be removed completely by rudimentary anti-virus software, then the attack has low 
payload persistence.  42
4. What is the effect of the exploit? Again, it is important to distinguish the difference 
between the exploitation and payload here. The effect of the exploit is the consequences of 
compromising the target system. The effect of the payload is the desired manipulation of 
data after access to the system has been achieved.  The effect of the exploit is important to 43
factor in because, if the attack requires a high level of covertness in order to accomplish its 
geopolitical goal but the exploitation of the network that is necessary for the attack to 
happen will be highly visible, then the attack and its goals will not align and it will fail to 
serve its geopolitical purpose. Sometimes, the attack is not worth the effort it takes to 
exploit the network. 
5. How covert is the attack? Covertness may be a desired attribute depending on the 
geopolitical goals of the attack.  Other times, lack of attribution may be more important 44
than hiding the fact that the attack took place at all. However, in this context, the question 
refers to concealing the fact that the attack is in progress. It is desirable in nearly all 
instances that the target not be aware that their systems are being compromised until after 
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the attack has taken place. Determining the level of covertness desired in execution of the 
attack is directly related to how aggressive the attacker wants to be in his reconnaissance.  
6. How mitigable is the exploit? This question determines how capable the target is in 
preventing exploitation. How strong or redundant is the cyber defense that the attacker is 
planning on overcoming or bypassing? A simple example is having a strong password. If 
the attacker is planning on exploiting a system by determining the target’s password, the 
attack can be easily mitigated by the target using a strong of a password as possible and 
having software that prevents “brute force” attacks that try as many password 
combinations as possible.  45
Types of Cyber Attacks 
 Now that the methodology of a cyber attack has been established, it is helpful to 
define broadly the different types of common cyber attacks that will be discussed in this 
analysis. The main types of attacks and terms to be discussed in this paper are malware, 
Distributed Denial of Service attacks, social engineering attacks (phishing, spear phishing, 
whaling, etc), and System Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) attacks. 
Malware 
 In the public discourse, malware and viruses are often used interchangeably. 
However, malware is actually a general term for any type of malicious software that the 
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owner of a device did not authorize the installation or use of. A computer virus is a specific 
type of malware. A virus is the term used to describe malware that spreads from the host 
system to other computers. Further specific types of malware include trojans (malware 
designed to appear safe so the user and the computer’s security system do not notice the 
threat), ransomware (malware that restricts access to the user’s data), and spyware (malware 
that monitors the user’s activity such as keystroke loggers). Hitherto in this paper, the term 
malware will be used for describing, in general, unauthorized malicious code or software. 
DDOS 
 Unlike malware, a Distributed Denial of Service attack, or DDOS, does not always 
involve injecting malicious code onto the target computer or network. One of the most 
common types of cyber attacks, a DDOS happens when too many hosts try to access a server 
all at once, causing a system or website to crash. While a DDOS can happen if enough real 
world users try to access a site at one time, this type of attack usually occurs though one 
attacker having access to hundreds or thousands of compromised computers—often called 
botnets—and instructing them all to access the targeted server.  
 Starting with one computer, the attacker loads light-footprint DDOS tools onto 
vulnerable systems through the internet often unnoticed by the infected system’s owner. Each 
compromised system becomes part of the botnet and contributes to the overloading of the 
target server. Because of the relative simplicity and low cost of DDOS attacks, they are 
commonly used by lone actors as well as states. Often, they are conducted to disrupt a 
company (often a financial institution) or state’s online service. 
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Social Engineering Attacks 
 Social engineering attacks are designed to trick users into giving away private 
information or unwittingly downloading malware. These attacks most often occur through 
emails. For example, the attacker will design an email falsely claiming to be from the user’s 
bank. The email will state that there is an issue with their account and that they need to call a 
specific number or click on a link to a website where the user inputs their banking 
information thinking that they are communicating with their bank. The attacker may also 
send attachments disguised to look both harmless and something of interest to the user, such 
as an invoice for a recent purchase. When the user downloads the attachment, malware is 
installed onto their system.  
 Social engineering attacks can vary from generic emails sent to many people 
(phishing), specifically tailored communications designed to look legitimate to one specific 
person (spear-phishing), or even target high-value/high-profile individuals such as CEOs or 
political party members (whaling).  
SCADA 
 SCADA attacks are possibly the most difficult and complex type of cyber attack to 
date. For their complexity, they can also have the highest payoff—resulting in physical 
damage to infrastructure as opposed to other cyber attacks whose damage is limited to 
espionage or data and communication disruption. 
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 If an attacker gains access to a SCADA system, they can manipulate machinery to 
operate outside of normal parameters to fail, or simply shut them down. Depending on the 
system that is compromised, this can result in power outages, lack of clean water, commuter 
train derailment, and more.  46
 As the global cyber threat becomes more realized, digitally networked critical 
infrastructure is increasingly being secured, making SCADA attacks more difficult for all but 
the most well-funded state sponsored hackers. The capabilities of conducting such attacks are 
lucrative to states for the widespread infrastructure disruption they can cause. 
Unique Characteristics of the Cyber Realm  
 What characteristics of the cyber realm make it a useful tool for state use? Beyond 
society’s reliance on technology for the execution of critical tasks, what are some of the 
unique factors to consider when a state executes, or falls victim to, a cyber attack?   
 First, cyber operations are relatively cheap. This is true both in monetary value and 
oftentimes in terms of manpower and risk versus reward. All it requires is the right hardware 
(which increasingly drops in price every year) and technically capable operators. Compared 
to other state tools, such as military power, cyber operations have an incredibly low barrier of 
entry to where nearly every state can quickly and cheaply establish a viable cyber operations 
program.  
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 Second, because cyber operations typically travel via global networks, they often 
allow for a wide degree of virtual freedom of movement. This virtual freedom of movement 
not only allows two geographically divided areas to interact in ways they couldn’t otherwise 
but also allows for operation within a third country—sometimes without their knowledge.  
 This leads to the third benefit, manipulation or masking of attribution. While the 
majority of cyber attacks have historically left trace clues that amount to circumstantial 
evidence, the accused state can often blame proxies that have little to no “official” tie to the 
state. Even worse, the attacking state can leave false evidence implicating another state.  
 Lastly, cyber operations provide for a new avenue of subversion and information 
warfare that offers unprecedented penetration of the target audience to be manipulated. One 
well-designed piece of foreign propaganda can find itself in the pockets of hundreds of 
millions of citizens within a span of minutes from creation to dissemination. Social media 
tools are specifically designed to maximize the exponential spread of ideas. For this reason, 
there could not be a more perfect delivery tool for anyone wanting to spread subversive mis-
information. 
Unique Characteristics of the Cyber Realm: Cost, Risk, and Effect 
 Cyber attacks range from a spectrum of fairly simple DDOS attacks to incredibly 
well-planned out and sophisticated SCADA attacks such as Stuxnet. In general terms, the 
simpler a cyber attack, the less expensive it is. The costs of state funded research and 
development of hacking tools varies depending on the target and is difficult to asses. 
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However, observations of the black market allow some level of insight into the general cost. 
According to Kapersky Labs, a DDOS attack can be purchased on the black market for $25 
an hour.  The cost of creating a DDOS attack on one’s own is estimated to cost as little as $7 47
an hour. This price varies depending on the number of computers one wants involved, the 
severity of the attack, and other factors. On the other end of the spectrum, a RAND study 
found that zero-day exploits can cost up to several thousands of dollars.  48
 The cost of cyber hardware is also cheap in relative terms compared to military 
weapons and equipment. As seen earlier in this paper, the cost of technology is continually 
dropping to the point that even developing nations can afford networked computing. Many 
cyber attacks do not require state of the art hardware. In fact, many hacking tools can be run 
on a Linux-based Operating System called “Kali.”  Linux operating systems are well known 
for their ability to run on outdated, cheaper computer hardware and are a popular choice for 
users of aging machines that do not have the power to run newer Windows and Macintosh 
operating systems. In fact, a lightweight version of the Kali OS can even be installed on the 
aforementioned Raspberry Pi minicomputer which costs less than $40 USD. 
 As far as risk goes, the less sophisticated, cheaper attacks typically do not cause 
permanent damage and historically leave no lasting effect. DDOS attacks, for example, only 
temporarily disrupt websites and communications. These low complexity attacks also have 
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the benefit of better attribution hiding. DDOS attacks utilize hundreds, sometimes thousands 
of computers that are often spread across the globe so finding the source of the attack 
sometimes can be complicated and evidence is typically circumstantial at best. Attack tools 
for DDOSes are also so widely proliferated that it is difficult to identify the source based on 
the design of the attack—like one could possibly do with complex, uniquely tailored attacks 
that could have only been accomplished by a small list of actors. This attribution is also made 
more difficult when a state utilizes “independent” parties to conduct the attacks. Both China 
and Russia have groups that have no official ties the government yet still are suspected of 
carrying out attacks on their behalf.   49
 Because of the difficulty of attribution and the fact that there is no permanent physical 
damage done, most cyber attacks carry very low risk for the attacker. No nation has 
responded with physical violent escalation in retaliation to a DDOS attack.  Historically, if 50
these attacks are retaliated against at all, it is only with more DDOS attacks. For instances of 
data theft, retaliation is usually done though federal indictments or, at most, limited effect 
sanctions.  This makes most cyber attacks incredibly lucrative. A nation state can disrupt 51
networked communications, conduct surveillance and even steal data for little monetary cost 
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and without fear of any significant international backlash. For revisionist powers, the risk is 
well worth the reward. 
 If used in conjunction with other types of action, such as when Russia used DDOS 
attacks in concert with military actions in Georgia,  the benefits of these attacks are 52
heightened because the attacker is now disrupting target communications to increase the fog 
of war and weaken the enemy in supplement to military forces. However, this can come at 
the cost of attribution because it is then easy to connect the cyber attack with the military 
attack—though Russia still used third parties to conduct these attacks to maintain some level 
of deniability.  53
 On the higher end of the cost-risk-reward spectrum are sophisticated types of cyber 
attacks that are designed to do significant damage against a highly hardened and secure 
target. In order to be successfully executed, these types of attacks typically need to be 
specially tailored to their specific target down to the make and model of routers and switches 
and require extensive research and design to counter the target system’s defenses. Stuxnet—
which stands as a cyber attack outlier due to its extreme complexity and physical effects—is 
the most popular example.  
 Attacks on this level of complexity carry much higher cost and risk than the attacks 
discussed thus far in this section. First, attribution is easier. The more complex and advanced 
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the attack is, the shorter the list of potential suspects with the capabilities and manpower to 
undertake such attacks. While anyone can conduct low to mid level cyber attacks, it takes 
considerable resources to design an attack on the scale of something like Stuxnet. An 
additional factor increasing attribution is that these attacks typically need to be specifically 
designed against the target. As will be discussed in the next section on attribution, the 
designers of one of a kind tailored attacks will typically leave behind digital fingerprints that 
give away the country of origin.  This is an additional risk that more proliferated cyber 54
attacks do not carry. 
 Another issue increasing the cost of the more highly complex cyber attacks is their 
limited use and shelf life. Unlike conventional weapons, many complex cyber tools cannot sit 
in a warehouse and wait to be used. Due to constant changes in technology, cyber tools will 
quickly become obsolete if the software they are designed to work against gets updated. The 
Stuxnet attack utilized several zero day exploits. The problem with “zero days” is that, once 
they are used against a target or otherwise discovered, the victim will patch the vulnerability 
to prevent a second attack. For this reason, many zero day exploits can only be used one time
—unlike conventional weapons or even less complex cyber attacks that use inherent 
vulnerabilities that cannot be eliminated. An additional complication of zero days is that, the 
longer the exploit goes unused, the greater the risk that the target realizes the vulnerability on 
their own and fixes it themselves, rendering the zero day useless. For this reason, once an 
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attacker has invested the time and effort to develop a cyber attack that utilizes zero day 
exploits, they have incentive to use the attack sooner rather than later.  Thus, complex 55
attacks that use zero days carry more cost and risk. 
 With the exception of these highly complex attacks, the vast majority of cyber 
operations can be carried out with significantly less cost and risk than other forms of 
International action such as conventional military operations and complex economic policies 
while reaping significant rewards. For relatively few dollars and very little risk of retaliation, 
a state can steal sensitive personal, corporate, and government information, spread 
propaganda, influence democratic processes, and disrupt vital communications. With this in 
mind, it seems an easy choice for a revisionist state to begin conducting cyber operations.   
Unique Characteristics of the Cyber Realm: Attribution 
 Perhaps the most widely discussed advantage of cyber operations is the appearance of 
anonymity, plausible deniability, and misattribution of cyber attacks. There are multiple 
reasons this is possible. First, cyber networks are connected across international borders and 
contain within them civilian, industrial, and military information data all along the same 
digital connections. Second, many low level “off the shelf” cyber attacks are widely 
proliferated among the civilian black market. This means that, when a state uses these 
attacks, it is more difficult to analyze the computer code to find clues indicating the origin of 
the attack. Even worse, a state can manipulate the digital fingerprints to implicate a different 
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Manipulate in the Digital Age (New York, New York: Public Affairs, February 2016).
!37
nation in what is called a “false flag” operation. Third, unlike physical weapons and 
conventional military resources and tactics, computer programming skills exist across the 
civilian and criminal world in addition to governments. Some states have taken advantage of 
this, using proxy organizations with no official ties to the government to conduct cyber 
operations allowing for the state to have deniability. If an attack gets traced to its source, the 
state can simply claim that it was conducted by rogue criminals who were not acting on 
behalf of the state, even if the result of the attack benefits that state. 
Attribution: Global Connectivity 
 The first obstacle in gaining attribution to cyber attacks is the fact that these attacks 
are sent and occur across a global network. If “nation A” was to conduct an attack against 
“nation B” on the other side of the globe, the malicious code may travel through multitude of 
other nations, internet service providers, and even reside long-term on other physical 
computers before the attack reaches its intended target. The Stuxnet virus is estimated to have 
taken months from its initial release to it infecting the nuclear site at Natanz  and it infected 56
over 200,000 computers in over 8 countries along the way.  57
 Because of this global connectivity, it is easy for an attacker to forward position 
himself in virtual space to begin an attack from within another country’s cyber network. If an 
attacker gains access to a computer located in another country, he can then use that victim 
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computer to begin launching the malicious code—further masking the source. Even if an 
attack is accurately traced to the correct terminal of origin, there is no guarantee of who was 
sitting behind that computer, developing and executing the attack. Someone acting on behalf 
of the Russian government can utilize a computer with a German-based Internet Protocol (IP) 
and MAC (Media Access Control) address to conduct an attack on Ukraine. 
Attribution: Digital Fingerprints 
 Digital fingerprints that can be analyzed following an attack can help find attribution 
for an attack, but it can also lead to false clues and mis-attribution. The past decade has seen 
a variety of cyber attacks that range in sophistication. As a general rule, less sophisticated 
attacks utilize open-source, proliferated scripts that require little tailoring to the target to be 
effective. On the other end of the spectrum are complex attacks against hardened targets that 
require significant planning, research, and original coding.  Because the sophisticated 58
attacks require such planning, customization, and original work, it is often possible to 
analyze the script of the attack in order to determine the originator. According to Kapersky 
Labs, “A combination of certain features of the code development environment stored in the 
files can be used as a ‘fingerprint,’ in some cases identifying the malware authors and their 
projects”.   For example, several attacks have been attributed to Russia due to the fact that 59
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there were Russian terms and language in the code. In another instance, metadata for certain 
malicious programs indicated that most of the code was written in what would have been 
daytime working hours in the Moscow time zone and never on Russian federal holidays. This 
indicates that the source might have been Russian state sponsored actors whose day to day 
job is to attempt to hack into foreign systems.  60
 Therefore, the more advanced the attack, the more evidence there is to discover some 
level of attribution in general. Additionally, when an attack is complex, it limits the list of 
who the possible perpetrators are. Like with military resources, while many nations have 
some form of cyber capability, they have varying levels of cyber prowess. For this reason, an 
attack as complicated as Stuxnet could only be attributed to a small group of nations and 
organizations and was far too complex to be executed by certain other players. Once an 
investigator factors in the target of the attack and suspected geopolitical goals, that list is 
further narrowed down to only one or two possible nations.  
 Even when the attack is traced to a third party (such as a criminal group or civilian 
hacker organization) with no official association to a state government, the suspected goal of 
the attack, geopolitical analysis, and historical precedence provides enough circumstantial 
evidence for the target nation to publicly accuse a suspected state of collaborating with that 
third party. Most of the “independent” groups responsible for carrying out cyber attacks that 
have benefited a state have been found to posses hidden ties with national governments. Even 
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if no direct tie can be established between a proxy group and a state, the suspected offending 
state can still be accused by the victim state of not preventing criminals from carrying out 
cyber attacks within their territory. Either way, the victim state typically has circumstantial 
evidence to carry out some form of political action against the offending state. Usually, this 
retaliation is done through federal indictments.  These political retaliations have thus far, 61
done little to stop or slow a nation down from conducting attacks. 
 Overall, while lack of attribution has been touted as a high advantage of cyber 
operations, history shows that most major attacks have been at least circumstantially 
attributed enough for the victim state to take political action against the suspected perpetrator. 
That being said, one additional factor should be discussed when it comes to the advantage of 
attribution—false flag operations. There has been much speculation on the possibility of a 
state carrying out a cyber attack and leaving false clues for the victim state to follow and 
attribute cause to a third, uninvolved state. In theory, the real perpetrator may want to do this 
in order to provoke two states into a conflict that would benefit the true originator of the 
attack. This is theoretically possible because most evidence that has been discovered when 
analyzing cyber attacks thus far has been circumstantial at best. By analyzing what evidence 
has been used in attributing past attacks, a state can plant false clues in the attack. For 
example, attacks on Ukraine and the US elections have been attributed to Russia because of 
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Russian terms in the coding and the code being scripted during Moscow daytime hours.  62
Knowing this, a future state that wants to provoke strife between two states can make sure to 
include linguistic terms in the code and design and execute the code during the time zone that 
fits whatever nation the perpetrator wants to implicate.  
Attribution: False Flags 
 There is evidence of groups (possibly states) attempting false flag operations with 
limited success. One example was found by Kapersky Labs in analyzing the 
OlympicDestroyer worm. This worm was used during the 2018 Pyongchang Olympics in 
South Korea. The worm temporarily shut down some South Korean IT systems ahead of the 
Opening Cermonies and brought down the Olympics website so people were unable to print 
tickets. According to Kapersky,  
“…the real interest of the cybersecurity industry lay not in the potential or even actual 
damage caused by the OlympicDestroyer’s attacks, but in the origin of the malware. 
Perhaps no other sophisticated malware has had so many attribution hypotheses put 
forward as the OlympicDestroyer. Within days of its discovery, research teams 
worldwide had managed to attribute this malware to Russia, China and North Korea, 
based on a number of features previously attributed to cyber-espionage and sabotage 
actors allegedly based in these countries or working for these countries’ 
governments.” 
!  Segal, Adam The Hacked World Order: How Nations Fight, Trade, Maneuver, and 62
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 Upon further analysis, however, Kapersky found a 100% match in some of the 
OlympicDestroyer’s coding to malicious software developed by a group called Lazarus, a 
nation-state backed group with links to North Korea. However, the 100% match was 
suspicious to researchers at Kapersky and, after more research into Lazarus’ past behaviors, 
tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) the cybersecurity agency found reason to believe 
that the portion of the code that matched Lazarus-developed software was intentionally 
placed within the worm to mislead forensic analysts.  
 “To our knowledge, the evidence we were able to find was not previously  used for 
attribution. Yet the attackers decided to use it, predicting that someone would find it. They 
counted on the fact that forgery of this artifact is very hard to prove,”  said Vitaly Kamluk, 63
head of the APAC research team at Kaspersky Lab.  
 He continues, “It’s as if a criminal had stolen someone else’s DNA and left it at a 
crime scene instead of their own. We discovered and proved that the DNA found on the crime 
scene was dropped there on purpose.”   64
 While the accurate attribution of the OlympicDestroyer attack is still under debate, it 
is possibly the first example of a false flag deception technique being used to manipulate 
evidence. Despite OlympicDestroyer’s sophisticated deception techniques, it was still found 
out by cybersecurity firms. However, like many cyber operations techniques, cyber deception 
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is still in its relative infancy and one can expect these deception techniques to increase in 
complexity and effectiveness as more attempts are made and tactics become more refined. 
Attribution: Geopolitics 
 Some authors claim that, while global connectivity allows for the possibility of 
ultimate digital freedom of movement and anonymity to mask attacks, geopolitics will still 
drive who attacks who and can provide circumstantial evidence to help in attribution.  In 65
other words, even though it is possible for a Russian agent to use, for example, a German 
based IP address to commit DDOS attacks against Ukraine, geopolitics will still narrow 
down who would want to conduct such an attack against the victim. It is much more likely 
that Russia would want to shut down Ukrainian government sites than Germany would. So, 
while ultimate freedom of movement can provide full anonymity in theory, in practical 
reality it is not often achieved and there are enough markers in the attack design to help find 
some level of attribution.  While anonymity in cyber attacks is theoretically possible, it is 66
not a guarantee. 
Just War, and the Gray Zone  
 The last aspect of cyber operations to analyze before looking at how revisionist 
powers have implemented it is whether cyber attacks legally count as an act of war and what 
!  Valeriano, Brandon & Maness, Ryan Cyber War Versus Cyber Realities: Cyber Conflict in 65
the International System (New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 2015).
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Analysis (New York, New York: Routledge Sudies in Conflict, Technology, and Security, 
2016).
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place cyber operations have in international law. This is important because legal ambiguity is 
an effective trait of gray zone operations—which will also be defined in this section. 
 There are multiple arguments that have been made advocating for cyber attacks to be 
classified by the UN as an action that warrants armed physical response. Most common is the 
argument concerning the UN’s prohibition on the use of force. 
 UN article 2(4) states, “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from 
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, 
or in other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”  67
 This article is referred to as one of the cornerstone provisions of the UN as an 
organization. There are other places in the UN charter that provide exceptions to this rule, 
such as Articles 51 and 39-42 where use of force is authorized in self-defense and under UN 
specific authorization respectively. Outside of those articles of exception, it is generally 
unauthorized for one state to use “force” on another state legally according to both the UN 
and customary international law.  68
 Applying cyber operations to this article is difficult for several reasons, according to 
Green. It does not help that the UN charter was written decades before any idea of cyber 
operations would come into practice. The first argument that Green cites is the definition of 
“force”. If it can be agreed upon that force is defined as acts that violate “the territorial 
67 Green, James "The Regulation of Cyber Warfare Under the Jus ad Bellum” in Cyber 
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integrity or political independence of any state…” as stated in article 4(2), then certain types 
of cyber attacks may fall outside that definition and do not violate territorial integrity or 
political independence. This is especially true since cyber attacks by nature often occur 
remotely and do not involve any physical incursion into another state’s territory, thus 
compromising their territorial integrity and the fact that the internet as a whole is not 
considered a part of any state’s sovereign territory. One could argue that a piece of hardware 
(or digital information) that belongs to a state is considered the territory of said state and 
therefore unwanted or non-condoned manipulation of that property constitutes territorial 
violation. This would be an unprecedented definition of territorial integrity, however.  
 An opposing argument would be that the article assumes an all encompassing 
definition of force that does include cyber operations. The final section of the article must 
also be taken into account, “…or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the 
United Nations.” It can be understood that this section of the article is a catch-all for any 
force of one state against another. 
 This does not automatically place cyber attacks within the realm of prohibited action, 
however, for there are some who argue that cyber attacks should not be considered “use of 
force” to begin with. For instance, if cyber operations count as use of force, then what about 
economic actions or other forms of soft power moves against a state? Proponents of this 
latter argument claim that the UN article only applies to “armed” force in any form. 
 An issue arises here as well, however, because there are multiple other sections of the 
UN charter where “armed force” is specifically named—such as in the Preamble and certain 
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articles within Chapter VII. If armed force is specifically mentioned in certain parts of the 
UN charter, then “force” as used in article 2(4) without the word “armed” should be a 
broader, all encompassing term to include unarmed force.  
 More theorists go further and further into this legal debate of interpreting Article 2(4) 
both for and against including cyber operations into the prohibition, even going as far as 
looking at the overall mission and purpose of the UN and whether it was founded solely to 
reduce armed, military conflict or all forms of dispute between states. At the time of this 
writing, such arguments have proven inconclusive.  
 There have actually been several states that have made appeals to the UN under 
article 2(4) against economic and political action taken against them. Such states include 
Brazil, Ecuador, and Iran. All such proposals have been rejected. Therefore, history and 
precedent has concluded that soft power acts such as economic and political coercion do not 
count as illegal use of force while armed conflict definitely is. Cyber operations, however, 
have no precedent nor clear place within this article. 
 Legal issues aside, what matters more is the precedent set both by states conducting 
cyber attacks and the response from the international community. After all, historical 
precedent and the reality of international actions determine common international law more 
than legal interpretations. The fact is that nations have retaliated little when they fall victim 
to cyber attacks. The victim states have, at most, responded with soft power actions such as 
sanctions, federal indictments of specific individuals or companies (such as China’s Huawei) 
associated with the attack. It is possible that they retaliate with cyber operations of their own 
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as well. However, these responses seem to have done little to deter or punish a state. Lack of 
solid evidence as discussed in the previous section only help to water down the impact of 
public accusal and retaliation.  
 Until something fundamental about cyber operations changes—such as a more solid 
means to apply attribution, establishment of new laws, or a significant increase in the damage 
done by cyber operations—then the precedent for international custom has been set. 
According to this newly established custom, cyber operations in their current form do not 
qualify as a violation of the UN charter and do not warrant armed response or hard power 
retaliation. This gives the green light for revisionist powers to continue conducting cyber 
attacks with little fear of reprisal. 
The Gray Zone 
 The characteristics of cyber operations discussed thus far make it an ideal tool for the 
realm of inter-state interactions referred to as the gray zone. 
 “Actions in the gray zone break, ignore, or diminish the rules-based international 
order. Sometimes they violate international law; other times, they push at the edge of 
international law.”  For this reason, there is not much use in a state appeal to the UN after 69
falling victim to a gray zone tool. This is because the gray zone tool either falls short of 
breaking international law (such as cyber operations under Article 2(4)) or, the tool does 
69 Dubik, James, Lt Gen, (U.S. Army, Ret.) & Vincent, Nic "America’s Global 
Competitions: The Gray Zone in Context,” Institute for the Study of War, (February 2018). 
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violate international law but the state uses it sparingly or defiantly, calling the bluff of the 
international community.  
 It is easy to see how well cyber operations fit into this paradigm. As seen earlier in 
this study, attribution for cyber attacks tend to be circumstantial at best and the impact of the 
attacks are typically limited in scope—not as violent or showy as physical attacks though the 
effects can sometimes be similar. It has also been seen through the analysis of Article 2(4) of 
the UN charter that cyber operations do not violate territorial integrity; the amount of legal 
ambiguity that exists in international law regarding cyber attacks further makes cyber 
operations lucrative for a state that bases their operations on bending the rules in order to 
deter retaliation. Analysis provided in this thesis of the character of cyber operations, 
international law, and the nature of the gray zone all indicate that state sponsored cyber 
operations are an ideal tool for revisionist powers who want to maximize their effectiveness 
in using the gray zone to subvert the current global order and achieve their own strategic 
goals without risk of retaliation. Now, this thesis will look into specific examples of how 
these revisionist powers have used cyber operations in an effort to identify their methods of 
operation and TTPs.  
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PART THREE: GEOPOLITICAL ANALYSIS 
Russia 
 Russia’s modern cyber operations history begins with their actions in Estonia in 2007. 
This was followed up a year later with cyber operations in concert with physical military acts 
in Georgia. In 2014, Russia followed a similar tactic in Ukraine including a SCADA attack 
and, most recently, utilized advanced information operations and manipulation of social 
media engines to interfere with US elections in 2016. In addition to the idea of reflexive 
control, another common theme throughout these cyber operations is Russia’s doctrine of 
blended cyber and information operations.  This concept will now be analyzed followed by a 
chronological look at Russia’s progression in cyber use from Estonia to the 2016 US 
Presidential election. By understanding Russia’s tactics in cyber operations, one can map the 
revisionist grey zone pattern that Russia is using, predict their future goals, and make a plan 
of action to deter them from threatening US interests. 
Blended Cyber and Information Operations 
 Russian cyber operations are unique in that they blend network intrusion and attacks 
with  information warfare. According to the US director of National Intelligence, Gen. James 
Clapper, Russia established a Cyber Command to conduct: “offensive cyber capabilities 
including propaganda operations and inserting malware into enemy command and control 
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systems. Russia’s armed forces are also a specialized branch for computer network 
operations.”  70
 According to Russian military doctrine, both cyber operations and information 
operations (IO) fall under the term “informatsionoye protivoborstvo” (IP) or “information 
confrontation” also known as Information Warfare (IW).   While Russia has used non-cyber 71
information operations as early as 1999 against Chechnya, the two concepts of cyber and IO 
are married together in Russian military doctrine and are fully integrated into modern 
military campaigns.  This has been true with Russian military operations in Georgia and 72
Ukraine. However, Russia has also been unafraid to use their information confrontation 
doctrine independent of military operations, as will be seen in the analysis of Estonia and the 
2016 US elections.  
Political Warfare 
 Russia’s concept of cyber operations is based on a modern application of Clausewitz’s 
writing on how states operate in times of peace. This modern application is commonly called 
“political warfare”. According to George Kennan:  
70 Blank, Stephen "Cyber War and Information War a la Russe” in Understanding Cyber 
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 “Political warfare is the employment of all the means at a nation’s command, short of  
 war, to achieve its national objectives. Such operations are both overt and covert.   
 They range from such overt actions as political alliances, economic measures, and  
 ‘white’ propaganda to such covert operations as clandestine support of ‘friendly’   
 foreign elements, ‘black’ psychological warfare and even encouragement of   
 underground resistance in hostile states.”    73
 Thus, while actual cyber operations are relatively new, Russia has used this new tool 
and integrated it organically within a blended information warfare and military doctrine that 
has existed since the Soviet period. 
Estonia 
 The Russian cyber attacks on Estonia are generally regarded as the first ever major 
cyber conflict. Relations between Moscow and the Estonian government had deteriorated in 
2007 due to Estonia announcing its intentions to move a memorial statue of a World War II 
Soviet soldier—commonly known as the Bronze Soldier—from the capital, Tallinn, to the 
city outskirts.  
 While this act angered ethnic Russians living in Estonia, the emotions and political 
anger revolving around the proposed move of the statue stemmed from much deeper roots. 
As a natural borderland between Russia and rest of Europe, Estonia has gone back and forth 
between Soviet occupation, independence, and Nazi invasion in the past 100 years. As a 
73 Blank, Stephen "Cyber War and Information War a la Russe” in Understanding Cyber 
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result, the nation’s population contained a blend between Estonians who viewed the statue as 
a symbol of Soviet occupation and ethnic Russians who viewed the proposed move of the 
monument as an insult to the 27 million Russians who died during the war.  
 Estonia’s decision to move the monument was not only a solution to smaller, practical 
issues  of public-order in the city (removing a site of tension and clashes between ethnic 
groups) but it was also a symbol of Estonia’s efforts to move outside their historical Soviet 
shadow and Russian sphere of influence to become more European. Shortly after Estonia 
proposed the plan to move the statue, Moscow made known its displeasure by exerting 
diplomatic pressure, threatening a boycott of Estonian goods, and issuing general warnings of 
serious consequences to the Russian-Estonian bilateral relationship. 
 The day before the proposed move of the statue, there were protests of up to 1,500 
people. The protests quickly turned violent and approximately 300 people were arrested. The 
protests revolving the move of the Bronze Soldier are cited by  Estonian officials as the 
“worst since the country declared its independence from the Soviet Union…” according to 
the Council on Foreign Relations.  74
 The cyber attacks began the night following the protests—hours before the move was 
scheduled. The attacks consisted of defacement of multiple government websites, a fake 
letter of apology from the Reform Party (lead political partner in the coalition government) 
74 Segal, Adam The Hacked World Order: How Nations Fight, Trade, Maneuver, and 
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for moving the statue, and the overload of the Estonian parliament’s email servers with spam, 
forcing a temporary shut down in email communications.  
 The cyber attacks that night were only the first wave. A few days later, the attacks 
increased in intensity and sophistication. DDOSes utilizing computers from all over the 
world shut down more Estonian websites including news outlet Postimees Online. The 
attacks culminated on 9 May, the same day Russia was officially commemorating the end of 
World War II. On that day, up to fifty-eight Estonian websites were down at any one time and 
Estonia’s largest bank, Hansabank, had their online services shut down intermittently for 
hours at a time between 9 and 10 May. Eventually, the Estonian government shut down all 
external internet communication in defense. According to the Council on Foreign Relations, 
“The internet within Estonia was accessible, but Estonians living abroad were cut off from 
their bank accounts and news services.” The cyber attacks finally ceased on 18 May at 11pm 
local (midnight, Moscow time).  75
 In the midst of the cyber attacks, the Russian government initiated a litany of soft 
power moves and public outcry: instituting sanctions on Estonia and demanding a revision of 
its laws concerning Russian minorities living in the country. Russia also accused Estonia of 
being a fascist regime and allegedly organized violent demonstrations both in Estonia and 
Russia, using groups such as Nashi (a Russian youth organization created by the Putin 
regime) to protest at the Estonian Embassy in Moscow. On 9 May, the same day that the 
75 Segal, Adam The Hacked World Order: How Nations Fight, Trade, Maneuver, and 
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cyber attacks culminated, Russian President Vladimir Putin had publicly stated that those 
who “defile the monuments to the heroes of this war are insulting their own people and 
spreading enmity and new distrust between countries and peoples.”  Despite Russia’s explicit 
public disapproval and smear campaign of Estonia’s action, all of the cyber operations 
against Estonia were conducted by proxy groups and botnets spread across the globe that 
allowed the Russian government freedom from attribution of the attacks.  76
 There are several key characteristics of the attack on Estonia that should be noted. 
First, the attacks were preceded by other forms of soft power threats. Second, the attacks 
were committed by groups or lone hackers that the Russian government could claim 
plausible deniability from. Third, while disruptive, the attacks on their own ultimately caused 
no permanent physical damage nor territorial compromise and, in fact, the first order effects 
of the attacks (mainly the disruption in communications and defacement of websites) only 
lasted for several hours, falling below the threshold of war; in other words, Estonia made a 
quick, full recovery from the cyber attacks. Lastly, the attacks were a part of a larger 
information campaign, often paired with public statements such as that observed by President 
Putin on the same day as the climax of the attacks.  
 These four characteristics fall perfectly in line with typical gray zone tactics and, 
when viewed not as a lone incident but instead grouped with Russia’s next attacks on 
Georgia and Ukraine, indicate a larger pattern of revisionist efforts to increase Russia’s 
76 Blank, Stephen "Cyber War and Information War a la Russe” in Understanding Cyber 
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sphere of influence into Europe without inciting a war. Russia’s actions against Estonia made 
a significant geopolitical statement at relatively low cost, risk, and damage thanks to the use 
of proxy groups (although Russian officials have been documented stating the government’s 
involvement in directing the attacks, though not conducting it themselves)  and avoidance of 77
physical damage. As such, retaliation against Russia was viewed as “not worth it” by both the 
victims and the international community.  
 There are two additional factors of note regarding the attack on Estonia that must be 
analyzed. First is Estonia’s unique dependance on networked technology. In 2007, the nation 
had quickly become one of the first countries to rely on networked technology for vital 
government and financial functions.   Second is the fact that the attack on Estonia may have 78
actually been a trial run for Russia to test new cyber tactics before conducting larger, future 
attacks. There are several indicators in Russia’s subsequent cyber use against Georgia and 
Ukraine that posit a high likelihood that Russia was using Estonia as a test bed to establish 
methods of integrating cyber into their military doctrine and use it as a tool to deter NATO 
and EU expansion in the region. 
 Estonia embraced technology shortly after its secession from the Soviet Union in 
1991. Following the country’s secession, Estonia was faced with the obstacle of trying to 
thrive as an independent country but lacking significant of physical communications 
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infrastructure and only half of its population having phone lines. However, this also proved 
to be a benefit for the country; deciding to use the internet to resolve their shortcomings, they 
were able to begin building from scratch as opposed to trying to update and recycle legacy 
technologies that other, more established nations of the time stuck with.   79
 An additional factor pushing the country towards early cyber dependance was the 
population’s IT knowledge base. Estonian workers played a major role in the Soviet Space 
program and Telegraph Agency. Tallinn’s Institute of Cybernetics, founded in 1960, provided 
the necessary educational foundation for many of the former Soviet workers. The 
technologically educated population combined with the lack of infrastructure pushed the 
Tallinn government to begin initiatives for the country to become one of the world’s first 
“information societies”.   80
 All Estonian schools had regular online access by 1998 and the country declared 
internet access a human right by 2000. This declaration would be the first for any 
government in the world (find citation in HWO if this is really true). The government’s 
cabinet went completely paperless and, in 2001, it became a national standard to issue ID 
cards equipped with digital signatures to Estonian citizens.  81
 By 2007, the same year as the cyber attacks, 95% of bank transactions were 
conducted on the internet (remember that Estonia’s largest bank had its services completely 
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stopped for periods as long as 90 minutes during the attacks), health forms were stored on the 
digital cloud, and voting and income tax filing (both of which require access to Estonian 
government sites) were conducted online. This heavy use of online services for critical 
infrastructure and communications made Estonia a lucrative target for any nation hoping to 
see what impact cyber attacks could have on a society.  82
 The very next year, Russia used very similar cyber tactics in Georgia, this time in 
conjunction with real world military actions. Based on what appeared to be newly developing 
Russian cyber tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), some theorists postulate that the 
Russian cyber operations in Estonia were a test run to see how a nation (and the rest of the 
world) would react to such information warfare. The apparent success in disrupting Estonia’s 
daily operations while steering clear of international condemnation and serious retaliation 
was a green light indication for Russia that their tactics were a feasible option as a gray zone 
tool.  
 Estonian authorities postulate that Russia’s larger objective in 2007 may have been to 
use their cyber influence to incite violent civil unrest between Estonians and ethnic Russians. 
This violence would have given the Kremlin justification to step in with physical action to 
protect pro-Russian factions, possibly even annexing part of Estonia. This plan is very 
82 Segal, Adam The Hacked World Order: How Nations Fight, Trade, Maneuver, and 
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similar to what Russia has done in Ukraine. In fact, this methodology is an exact example of 
Russia’s “Reflexive Control” strategy.  83
Georgia 
 As stated, Russia’s cyber attacks in Georgia incorporated the tactics seen in Estonia, 
but were implemented into a larger scheme of maneuver organically tied to physical military 
operations. 
 South Ossetia was the focal point of the conflict—a semi-autonomous area that 
already had a tenuous relation between Georgia and Russia. In the mid-2000s, South Ossetia 
had voted for full independence from Georgia and also had intentions of joining NATO.  In 84
2008, South Ossetian and Georgian forces exchanged gunfire with over 8,000 Russians 
conducting military exercises just across the border.  The fighting peaked when Georgian 85
forces made it to the Ossetian capital, which triggered a Russian military response. After 
Russian forces pushed all the way to the Georgian capital of Tbilisi, Russia recognized 
Ossetia as an independent nation.   86
 While the conflict itself was short-lived, It carried a great amount of significance to 
Russia for two reasons. First, this conflict marked Russia as a power that was willing to 
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ignore international standards and institutions—by unilaterally using physical force and 
intervention, violating a nation’s sovereignty—in order to achieve their own strategic 
objectives. Second, this was the first time Russia integrated offensive cyber operations into 
conventional, physical warfare. 
 Extremely similar to Estonia, Georgian government websites came under attack and 
were shut down. This happened shortly before Russian military troops began moving against 
Georgia.  Additionally, the website for the largest commercial bank in Georgia was taken 87
down in conjunction with Georgian forums where local hackers might try to organize a 
defense or cyber counter attack.  88
 While most of the cyber actions were unsophisticated DDOS attacks and website 
defacement, these simple attacks were implemented in a very coordinated and complex way
—in perfect timing with physical military maneuvers. The list of targeted websites 
skyrocketed at the same time that Russian troops established positions in Georgia.  The 89
victimized sites included government agencies, financial institutions, business groups, 
educational institutions, news media, and a Georgian hacking forum. This was likely to 
prevent a coordinated Georgian government response and to increase the “fog of war.” With 
the Georgian government limited in their ability to communicate to their citizens and the 
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outside world, there was widespread confusion within the country. As soon as the physical 
military operations ended, so did the cyber attacks. Websites were later found that revealed 
online discussions of the upcoming military operations several weeks before the fighting 
actually started.  The near perfect coordinated timing between the physical and cyber attacks 90
indicate that—even if the latter were conducted by non-government entities—the cyber 
attackers likely had access to the Russian military’s tactical plans and list of targets. 
 Interestingly, Russia denied responsibility for the cyber attacks, despite their clear 
physical military involvement in the conflict. Beyond the geopolitical initiative, there was 
other evidence pointing to Russia’s involvement in the attacks to include Russian terms in the 
malicious code and the term “win+love+in+Russia”. This is all circumstantial evidence at 
best, however. Additionally, it is highly possible for the real perpetrator of attacks such as this 
to purposely insert clues into the code to mislead analysts into thinking that a certain nation 
was behind the attack—the false flag operations discussed earlier in this thesis. 
 Further complicating the issue of attribution, much of the coordination for these 
attacks were done in the public internet domain. Russian speaking websites such as 
"stopgeorgia.ru" distributed instructions on how to help with DDOS attacks against Georgian 
websites. Therefore, anyone in the world could contribute to the attack and the Russian 
government could claim no responsibility for the actions and information shared across a 
public website. Russia argued that, technically, anyone could be behind the attack.  
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 This was an expert move on Russia’s part. Not only did using the public domain make 
it harder to accuse the Kremlin of the attacks, it also shifted the focus to who Russia claimed 
was actually the source of the attacks—a disgruntled people looking for a way to speak out 
against unjustness. The topic of international conversation turned from accusing Russia of 
being behind the attacks to a discussion on expression of free speech. Russia argued that 
cyber attacks were simply another way for the public to speak out freely. 
 One piece of convicting evidence, however, pointing to government involvement, was 
the fact that "stopgeorgia.ru" published a comprehensive list of digital targets for DDOS 
attacks mere hours after the Russian military advanced. The cyber attacks simply seemed too 
well coordinated with the military operations to have been planned entirely in a vacuum. 
Still, the evidence was circumstantial at best. 
 Finally, Russia’s IO campaign extended beyond the typical cyber attacks aimed at 
shutting down government services and sites. Russian bloggers manipulated a CNN-Gallup 
poll, filling the site with comments that tried to justify Russia’s cause and overwhelm any 
pro-Georgian posts or comments.  Different from DDOS attacks and other forms of cyber 91
attack, publicly posting opinions on social media and news sites is perfectly legal and there 
was little way to prove whether the source of the posts was the Russian government or just 
opinionated Russian citizens. There are major similarities between the CNN-Gallup poll 
posts and the social media propaganda flood that Russia used during the 2016 US 
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Presidential election. These similarities could indicate that Russia was experimenting with 
social media influence as far back as 2008 and had a more refined tactic by the 2016 
elections. 
 What was Russia’s geopolitical goal in the attacks on Georgia? To prevent Georgian 
accession to NATO and demonstrate Russia’s dominance in the region. Not only did Russia’s 
combined IO and IW campaign significantly contribute to that cause, it allowed them to 
achieve it without inciting a conventional war and set a precedent that Russia would 
maximize in future international disputes. 
 Georgia’s defense against the attacks, while much better than Estonia’s, bring up yet 
another interesting issue. While Estonia essentially defended their networks on their own and 
resorted to shutting down their external communications, Georgia relied on servers owned—
and located within—other nations. Agencies within Poland and Estonia offered their servers 
to host the Georgian websites that were under attack so that they could still be accessed. US 
companies such as Google also offered up their server space.   This brought up some 92 93
potential international complications, because this act of assistance by US business were 
conducted without knowledge or approval of the US government. By offering an auxiliary 
for Georgian government communications, Google (and other smaller companies) effectively 
involved the US in the conflict. In fact, Russia’s DDOS attacks followed Georgia’s trail of 
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retreat and began attacking US servers.  This means that Russia was attacking Georgian 94
government and banking websites hosted on commercial US servers in assistance to a 
Russian military advancement.  
 Estonia and Georgia: Factors Contributing to Attack Effectiveness 
 While the cyber attacks on Georgia were remarkably similar to that against Estonia, 
the short term effects were much different. There are two main reasons for this. First, Georgia 
was significantly less dependent on networked technology for critical communications than 
Estonia was. Second, Georgia was less technologically advanced and most of their physical 
cyber infrastructure ran through Russian territory. 
Estonia and Georgia: Physical Infrastructure 
 Regarding the physical cyber infrastructure (the physical cables and nodes that carry 
the information both within a nation and across the world), Estonia had the benefit of being 
an internet exchange point (IXP). IXPs are nodes where multiple network carriers meet. By 
having an abundance of node intersections, Estonia was able to maintain internal 
communications while cutting themselves off from outside the outside world. Georgia on the 
other hand, did not have these physical luxuries and thus could not cut themselves off 
without also shutting down internal communications. In fact, most of Georgia’s cyber 
infrastructure ran through Russia—giving them little control or power over communication 
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flow. This demonstrates that the physical layout of a nation’s cyber infrastructure is an 
extremely important factor to plan for when it comes to both cyber attacks and defense. 
Estonia and Georgia: Technological Reliance 
 The difference in technological reliance between Estonia and Georgia is a second 
good point of analysis that indicates a direct correlation between cyber attack effectiveness to 
the number of networked devices in the victim nation. As stated earlier, Estonia chose to be 
heavily dependent on technology very early in the digital age. According to the Council on 
Foreign Affairs, Estonia had 57 “digital users” for every 100 in 2007.  In 2008, Georgia only 95
had seven.  Almost no Georgian government services like finance and energy were 96
connected to the internet. While the attack on Estonia prevented many citizens from 
conducting bank transactions and conducting essential services with the government, this was 
not the case with Georgia. The main disruption that Georgia suffered was the interruption of 
internal government communications as well as the broadcasting official statements to the 
rest of the world during the attacks.   97
 The difference in impact of Russia’s attacks on both nations help to inform the rest of 
the world on the effectiveness of cyber attacks. As a general rule, the more dependent a 
nation is on cyber networks to accomplish critical services, the more vulnerable they are to 
attack. For example, a nation like North Korea is much less vulnerable than a technocratic 
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population like Seattle or San Francisco. Additionally, as more cities and nations become 
dependent on technology, it is good to note that the more redundant the infrastructure is, the 
more resilient it will be against attack. Georgia’s ability to shift its websites to auxiliary 
servers (despite their location in other countries), helped mitigate the impact. This is one way 
that nations can defend against cyber attacks in the future to minimize disruption of low level 
attacks.  
Ukraine 
 Two years after the Georgian conflict, Russia adopted a military doctrine that 
described contemporary conflict as “intensification of the role of information warfare.”  The 98
doctrine further stated that a modern military should use information warfare to achieve 
political objectives without the use of a conventional military force. If a military force must 
be used, then information warfare should work to form a “favorable response from the world 
community.”  99
 Russia’s 2014 intervention in Crimea demonstrated this military doctrine and further 
refined Russian tactics in using cyber operations—in the form of information warfare—to 
augment physical military action. While Russia follows the same pattern in Ukraine as in 
Estonia and Georgia, Ukraine stands out because the conflict was far deeper, the violence 
was longer lasting and, (unlike in Estonia and Georgia) Russia actually attempted to annex 
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Crimea—a much bolder geopolitical move. Lastly, the Ukraine conflict witnessed a 
successful SCADA attack. 
 The conflict originated with demonstrations against the pro-Russian Ukrainian 
government at the time and a coup that overthrew their leader, Viktor Yaukovych. Russia 
viewed these acts as the US and the West trying to gain influence on the Russian border by 
trying to manipulate the Ukraine into becoming a pro-Western state.   100
 As the fighting started, Russian actors conducted heavy information operations 
through every medium including the internet to influence the Ukrainian and international 
audiences’ perception of events. This was met with significant retaliation not only from 
Ukraine but also non-state actors such as Anonymous—an independent hacker group. 
Ukrainian hackers disabled websites belonging to the Kremlin, the Russian central bank, and 
Russia’s Foreign Ministry while OpRussia—a subgroup of Anonymous—attacked Russian 
business and government sites to include sites for the Russian Air Force and the Federal Drug 
Control Service of Russia.  Ukrainian actors were also able to hack into Russian Interior 101
Ministry servers to view closed-circuit television cameras to monitor Russian troop 
movements and military hardware.  102
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 In addition to the IO campaign, a NATO study found that Russia had been conducting 
a cyber campaign dubbed “Operation Armageddon” which began in mid-2013.  According to 
a US  cybersecurity firm,  Ukrainian officials and high-level targets received spear-phishing 
emails containing malware designed to gain information on Ukrainian military strategies  103
(a precursor to the spear-fishing tactics used against the Democratic National Convention in 
2016). While these spear-phishing attacks occurred while Yaukovych was still in power, the 
timing lines up with Ukraine’s public interest in the Ukraine-European Union Association 
Agreement, which Russia opposed. Yaukovych eventually decided not to sign the agreement, 
which helped spark the pro-West rebellion that ousted him. 
 Throughout the fighting, Russia’s cyber tactics largely mirrored operations in Estonia 
and Georgia—until 23 December 2015.  On that date, three electric power distribution 104
companies were shut down by cyber attacks. This disrupted power for over 220,000 
customers.  Additionally, hackers launched a DDOS attack against call centers which 105
prevented Ukrainian residents from calling and reporting the power outage. This attack on 
SCADA systems had real, physical effects much like the Stuxnet attack on Iranian nuclear 
facilities and was far more sophisticated than any cyber operations conducted in Estonia and 
Georgia.  
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 The US Department of Homeland Security conducted an investigation revealing that 
the attacks were conducted remotely by exploiting legitimate credentials  of Ukrainian 
operators. The attackers gained remote control of breakers at over 50 regional substations. 
According to the investigation, the attackers likely gained these credentials far in advance of 
the attack, which means they waited specifically until December of 2015 to execute.  106
 Why did Ukraine witness a cyber attack on their infrastructure when Georgia and 
Estonia did not and why did it occur so late in the conflict? Russia had the ability and means 
to conduct attacks on Georgia’s energy infrastructure  but did not execute, whereas they did 107
in Ukraine. Strategically, Russia may have conducted this SCADA attack in Ukraine in 
response to a similar attack led by Ukrainian nationalists and Crimean Tartars one month 
before. In this attack, the nationalists disabled electricity transmission lines to Crimea. They 
did this through conventional means (physically toppling the transmission towers).  This 108
resulted in a Crimean power outage that lasted two weeks. It is possible that Russia decided 
that an attack on Ukrainian power infrastructure was an appropriate response to Ukraine’s 
escalation of the conflict.  While the effect of Russia’s response (loss of power) may have 
been equal, the means of accomplishing the effect (a cyber attack on a SCADA system) was 
entirely new and demonstrates Russia’s ability to deter an enemy (and even cause physical 
harm) through cyber means when Russia deems such an attack as appropriate. 
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 The final example of Russia’s cyber use in interstate competition is the 2016 US 
Presidential elections. According to the Council on Foreign Relations and the FBI,  a group 109
of hackers called Cozy Bear with links to the Federal Security Services of Russia (FSB) 
infiltrated the Democratic National Committee (DNC) and Republican National Committee 
(RNC) in 2015. The hackers were able to gather emails, donor rolls, and other information on 
these servers uncontested. The hackers also successfully used a spear phishing attack to gain 
access to John Podesta’s (the chairman of Hillary Clinton’s presidential campaign) email 
account. In 2016, a second hacker group known as Fancy Bear—with links to Russian 
Military Intelligence group GRU—was also discovered as having access to both parties’ 
servers.   110
 Initially, the US viewed these hacks as state versus state espionage—something every 
nation does. US news services reporting on the hacks assumed the Russians wanted to 
understand the US political system along with strengths and weaknesses of the political 
candidates. These assumptions proved false when a third hacker personality called Guccifer 
2.0 made released stolen internal DNC documents to journalists and Wikileaks.  111
 Wikileaks published the documents three days before the Democratic National 
Convention and unveiled strife and instability within the DNC regarding Bernie Sanders’ 
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campaign. Another website called DCLeaks was quickly created and also began releasing 
DNC documents while news sources such as the New York Times, the Washington Post and 
others began sifting through the documents for news stories that embarrassed and 
undermined both the DNC and the Hillary campaign.   112
 As a part of Guccifer 2.0’s public release, he claimed that the DNC hacks were 
conducted by a lone actor not associated with Russia. Most agencies suspected Guccifer 2.0 
to be a front for Russian intelligence to take suspicion off from Cozy Bear and Fancy Bear. 
The documents that Guccifer 2.0 offered, however, appeared to have been edited on Russian 
computers and linguistic proof was found that indicated Guccifer 2.0 was a native Russian 
speaker.  113
 One month before the presidential election, the Department of Homeland Security 
and the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) formally accused and attributed Russia for 
the hacks, claiming that the hacks were designed to interfere with the US election process. 
Three separate cyber security companies also came into agreement regarding Russian 
attribution after analyzing the attacks and digitally monitoring the hackers that were 
suspected of being responsible. The US decided to expel 35 spies and sanctioned the GRU, 
FSB, four intelligence officers, and three companies that assisted the hackers.  114
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 In addition to the DNC and RNC hacks, there was an extensive social media 
campaign conducted by Russia through an organization known as the Internet Research 
Agency (IRA).  This St. Petersburg-based group was founded in 2013 and has been a close 115
ally of President Putin and Russian intelligence. The initial goal of this group in 2013 was to 
write blog posts, comments, memes, and videos supporting certain Russian government 
interests while criticizing opponents. In April of 2014, the group expanded their operations to 
include influencing US political issues through social media. This naturally led to the group 
attempting to influence US citizens in voting decisions during the 2016 Presidential 
campaign.   116
 The IRA flooded social media platforms with pictures, posts, and memes designed to 
criticize certain candidates while promoting others. This included the creation of several 
Facebook pages, groups, and false news sites whose articles would be shared and re-posted 
across the web. The IRA even went so far as to pose as American citizens and organize real 
world political rallies in major cities—coordinating with real US activists who did not know 
they were actually working with the Russian group.   117
 These US activists unwittingly provided deeper knowledge and strategies to the 
Russian based misinformation operators. For example, according to the US Justice 
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Department, the IRA made contact with a Texas-based activist who advised them to ignore 
firm red and blue states such as Texas and Vermont and to shift their efforts on “purple 
states” that could vote either way in the election.   118
 This type of information provided by unwitting US citizens about which states were 
worth targeting helped the IRA who lacked that type of intimate, insider knowledge on the 
US political system. According to the Justice Department, there was a noticeable change in 
the IRA’s tactics and their spending habits on Facebook ads as the campaign progressed and 
the group gained more knowledge to fuel their methodology.  At the start of the campaign, 119
the attacks lacked cohesion and clear direction. However, they became more focused, 
organized, and refined as the IRA gained more knowledge in how to efficiently target their 
ads and misinformation to audiences who would be most receptive to it. 
 So then, what were Russia’s geopolitical goals in the US election hacks? According to 
the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the primary goal was to “sow 
discord in American society” and that Russia had no goals of supporting a specific 
candidate.  While Russia has actively supported fringe political parties and disparaged anti-120
Russian candidates in other countries in past elections, the House concluded that this was not 
the case in the US elections. However, the Senate Intelligence Committee came to a 
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seemingly different conclusion. According to the Senate, the Russian hackers specifically had 
goals to support President Trump and disparage Clinton.  121
 Research teams and independent analysts have stated that the two different objectives 
stated by the House and Senate are not mutually exclusive. While there is evidence indicating 
the IRA’s support of president Trump, there is also evidence of support for Bernie Sanders 
and as well as attempts at general confusion and distrust in the American political system. 
Either way, it appears that both objectives were met, regardless of which one was Russia’s 
true intent.  122
 Russia’s hacks on the US presidential campaign demonstrated a new level of 
Information Operations. It was the manifestation of their 2010 military doctrine that 
described contemporary conflict as “intensification of the role of information warfare” and 
stated that a modern military should use information warfare to achieve political objectives 
without the use of a conventional military force. Rather than DDOS attacks and website 
defacement like in Estonia, Georgia, and Ukraine, Russia was able to utilize much more 
complicated and subtle misinformation tactics that started with espionage and theft followed 
by using the information gained to shape the news, media, and online landscape to influence 
US citizens. This misinformation even resulted in physical actions with political rallies being 
formed.  
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 The organization of political rallies serves as a disturbing proof of concept. If Russian 
online personas were able to organize offline, real world political rallies, it would not be a far 
leap for these Russian entities to organize riots, protests, or even violent actions purely 
through online influence. In fact, this has already been done in the past with non-state actors. 
The Islamic State in Iraq and Al-Sham (ISIS) has extensively used social media to spread 
their ideology and influence violent “lone wolf” attacks across the globe, often providing 
instructions on how to conduct these attacks.  The difference with Russia, however, is their 123
subtlety. They have proven capable of organizing a physical presence to achieve their 
geopolitical goals without the organizers and participants knowing that they were being 
influenced by a foreign state power. This is a clear achievement of their contemporary 
military doctrine of using information operations to achieve political objectives without the 
use of physical military action. 
China 
 China is the second revisionist power that has heavily used cyber operations to gain 
strategic interests and destabilize the global status quo. A look at how China has implemented 
cyber operations, however, will show some fundamental differences in their tactics. Where 
Russia uses misinformation, subversive use of social media, and cyber operations organically 
paired with forms of soft power and even physical military action, China utilizes a more 
subtle approach of data theft, corporate espionage, and Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs). 
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Also worth analyzing are China’s heavy cyber defenses and controls on networked access 
courtesy of their “Great Firewall” and “Great Cannon.” 
China’s Two Sided Cyber Doctrine 
 China has a very dual-sided view of the internet. First, they see it as fundamental to 
economic growth and in keeping up with the rest of the world. On the other hand, however, 
the government also sees the internet as a vulnerability that allows Western influence to reach 
in and create unrest among the country.  
 In a white paper published in 2010,  China described the internet as having an 124
“irreplaceable role in accelerating the development of the national economy.” The paper also 
discussed its valuable use in supervision and quick dissemination of information from the 
government to the people. China has a centralized social media platform called Weibo that 
allows the government to see what issues the populace are discussing and can then 
disseminate information appropriately to maintain order. 
 However, another paper—this time published by the People’s Liberation Army Daily 
in 2015—states that,  
 “Foreign forces use this convenient tool of the internet to build ‘value traps,’   
 implement a ‘cultural cold war,’ and foster ‘a fifth column,’ befouling leaders,   
 vilifying heroes, mocking the system…[A]ttacks against the army may be said to   
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 have reached a state of unbridled brazenness, making the Internet into ‘concession’ to  
 peddle Western ideology.”   125
 This perceived ideological threat from the West has caused China to create a 
comprehensive cyber defense which is colloquially called the Great Firewall of China. 
China’s First Political Objective: Defense and the Great Wall of China 
 The Great Firewall is a combination of technologies that filter and block material 
originating from outside of China that is deemed offensive or a threat to the Chinese 
government. In addition, the Great Firewall has several inward looking tools that censor 
content generated within the country. In addition to filtering for offensive content, the Great 
Firewall is also used to block malicious code that would attempt to attack computer 
systems.  126
 China has been very public in favoring a controlled internet over an open one. The 
head of the State Internet Information Office—which regulates the nation’s internet—further 
defined China’s stance, stating that China was hospitable to western websites but should also 
be able to, “Choose who can come to our home and be our guest. I can’t change who you are 
but I have the power to choose my friends. I wish that all who come to China will be our real 
friends.”  127
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 China’s role in controlling the internet does not end with passive filtering and 
blocking of content, however. The nation also has an extensive history of hacking companies 
and websites who exist outside the country. Their public purpose for doing this is to stop—at 
the source—any entity who may be an online threat to the government’s control over its 
people.  
 For example, China has another national cyber tool called the Great Cannon, that is 
capable of creating severe cyber attacks. The Great Cannon allows China to intercept foreign 
web traffic inbound to the country, inject malicious code into the transmission, then redirect 
the traffic elsewhere.  The world discovered this new capability in 2015 when China caused 128
the website Github to crash. GitHub is a popular website for programmers to post source 
code free for use by the public. A nonprofit organization had used the site to publish a 
program that would allow Chinese web users to circumvent the Great Firewall. Seeing this as 
a threat, the Chinese government used their Great Cannon to shut down the website for five 
days.  129
 China’s Great Firewall, Great Cannon, and cyber attacks in the name of defense and 
censorship constitute only one aspect of their cyber doctrine. China’s cyber capabilities 
discussed up to this point are only designed to help the country shape the internet into a more 
favorable environment. This thesis will next discuss the next aspect of China’s cyber doctrine
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—espionage, data theft, and advanced persistent threats designed to give them an edge in 
achieving regional political adjectives without resorting to physical acts of war.  
China’s Second Political Objective: Economic and Military Competition 
 As stated earlier, China’s view of the internet is twofold. It is an avenue for dangerous 
outside influence as well as for economic prosperity. For the former, China’s solution is the 
Great Firewall and cyber attacks conducted for the purpose of crafting a favorable internet. 
When it comes to economic prosperity, however, the country has resorted to data theft and  
corporate espionage.  
 In addition to giving Chinese companies an edge against foreign competition, this 
espionage gives the same added benefit to the Chinese military—allowing them to see what 
the US defense industry is working towards in order for the Chinese to keep up.  China has 130
stolen military data on over two dozen Department of Defense weapons programs including 
the Patriot missile system, the F-35 Joint Combat Fighter, and the Littoral Combat Ship—the 
US Navy’s new category of surface warships.   131
 While spying on adversary military capabilities is standard operations for most 
countries, this is especially important for China. Chinese defense spending is less than one-
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fourth of the US  and, while the US military has been actively engaged in combat nearly 132
consistently since the turn of the century, the Chinese military is largely untested. China fears 
that their military will not be able to stand up to a conflict with the US and thus relies on 
extensive espionage to compensate. 
 There are multiple regional hotspots that China is involved in where they fear US 
intervention: Taiwan, the South China Sea dispute, and Chinese Naval expansion into the 
South Pacific. In order for China to deter the West from intervention—or, worse, avoid a loss 
should a military conflict arise—the nation resorts to cyber espionage to give the every 
competitive edge possible against US military capabilities and development.  133
 While examining every instance of Chinese cyber attacks, espionage, and data theft 
would not be feasible in the scope of this paper, this thesis will examine a few key operations 
that indicate China’s successful use of cyber operations to achieve their political objective of 
economic and military competition. 
Titan Rain 
 China’s first notable data theft attack was discovered in 2003 by a network 
administrator for Sandia Labs. On investigating a data breach on a Lockheed Martin facility 
in Florida, he discovered that computers in China were in possession of a complete network 
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scan report of Ft Dix—a US Army Post located in New Jersey. The next year, the same 
network administrator discovered that the same attackers from before had obtained hundreds 
of documents belonging to multiple US research and military facilities—this time including 
the Defense Contract Management Agency and the World Bank. 
 These two discoveries, coupled with several others being researched by the FBI, were 
collectively given the name “Titan Rain.” This attack stands out because it raised awareness 
for the threat of Chinese data theft and identified a new type of cyber attack called an 
“Advanced Persistent Threat” or, APT. 
 Lockheed Martin describes APTs as targeted, coordinated, and purposeful cyber 
attacks that operate for a prolonged period of time (months or years) against a target with 
intent and opportunity.  Most of China’s cyber attacks have these traits and are often only 134
discovered after the malicious program has been siphoning off data from a specific target for 
months or even years. 
APT10 2006-2018 Hacks 
 While china has a very extensive list of corporate hacks that have resulted in the theft 
of intellectual property both in the private and military sector, perhaps one of the longest 
running APTs was discovered in December 2018. In that month, US officials indicted two 
Chinese nationals who were identified as members of a group known in the cyber security 
134 Hutchins, Eric "The Cyber Kill Chain,” Lockheed Martin, 2019, https://
www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/capabilities/cyber/cyber-kill-chain.html.
!81
community as APT10—a hacking group acting on behalf of the Chinese Ministry of State 
Security.  135
 These two individuals were charged for involvement in a hacking campaign that had 
started in 2006.  By 2018, dozens of companies around the world along with several US 136
military agencies were compromised to include the US Navy, NASA, Hewlett Packard, IBM, 
and several companies “involved in aviation, space and satellite technology, finance, 
electronics, healthcare, oil and gar exploration” according to a Reuters report.  FBI Director 137
Christopher Wray stated, “The list of victim companies reads like a ‘Who’s Who’ of the 
global economy”.   138
 According to the FBI director, “No country poses a broader, more severe long-term 
threat to our nation’s economy and cyber infrastructure than China…China’s goal, simply put 
is to replace the US as the world’s leading superpower, and they’re using illegal methods to 
get there.”  139
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 It is clear, then, that China’s cyber espionage attempts are specifically targeting two 
categories of industries: 1. Industries where stolen intellectual property would give Chinese 
firms a competitive advantage (science, engineering, and technology), 2. Military 
infrastructure in order to give the Chinese military knowledge of the US military’s 
capabilities. 
 In addition to those above two categories, however, exists a third target—information 
that would prove useful for counterintelligence purposes. Among all the data that was stolen 
were the Social Security numbers of more than 100,000 US Naval personnel.  This was far 140
from the first time that personnel data of US citizens—specifically US government workers
—were compromised. Two other major data breaches involved the Office of Personnel 
Management and the Marriott hotel chain. These two data breaches will now be discussed to 
demonstrate how China is achieving their third political objective through cyber attacks—a 
counterintelligence advantage over the US. 
China’s Third Political Objective: Counterintelligence 
 In July of 2014, the media reported that Chinese hackers had compromised servers 
belonging to the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). OPM is responsible for the 
personal information of tens of thousands of federal employees. Specifically, OPM maintains 
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security investigation paperwork for every individual who has access to classified 
information—including military and intelligence personnel.   141
 The security investigation documents that the Chinese gained access to included what 
is known as a Standard Form 86. This form is filled out by every individual applying for a 
security clearance to access classified information. Beyond basic personal information such 
as Social Security numbers, data on this form includes disclosure of financial trouble, alcohol 
and drug history,  as well as other very private information such as a list of close friends 142
from every address the individual has lived sometimes up to ten years prior to the date of the 
application. For example, a federal employee who is filing the paperwork for a security 
clearance at the age of 22 years old would have to document on that form every place they 
have lived along with close friends who knew them at each address starting from the time 
they were 12 years old.   
 There exists significant speculation as to what the Chinese could do with this data—
everything from blackmailing US government workers to tracking down and arresting 
clandestine intelligence officers working abroad. Regardless of what counterintelligence 
actions China could take with this information, the data gained has certainly given China a 
comprehensive picture of nearly every US federal employee and official. The information 
from the OPM data breach provides China with a groundwork on which they can connect 
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other personal data to—such as the case with the 2018 data breach on the Marriott hotel 
chain. 
 In 2018, Marriott announced that hackers had gained access into the company’s 
reservation system. Initially, it was dismissed as a case of criminals trying to steal financial 
data such as credit card information. However, the hotel chain discovered that the hackers 
had gained access as early as 2014 and maintained persistence for years, gaining information 
on over 500 million customers.  For hackers to stay inside a system for that long is an 143
unusual method of operations for criminals looking for financial gain. This extended access 
was consistent with Chinese APTs, though, and the tools used to gain access were the same 
ones implemented in previous data breaches also attributed to the Chinese.  144
 The hack was also initiated shortly after the OPM hack had been publicly announced. 
Therefore, it is possible that, after discovery of the OPM breach, China began looking for 
other avenues to gaining private information on high interest US individuals.  As the 145
world’s largest hotel operator—owning Starwood, the Sheraton, Westin, and over 20 other 
hotel brands—Marriott has a high frequency of stays from US federal employees, officials, 
and military members traveling both for work and leisure. 
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 While not as personal as the information gained from the OPM hacks, compromised 
Marriott data included names of travelers, passport numbers, address, phone numbers, birth 
dates, and email addresses. If China was, in fact, behind the data breach, they could pair hotel 
data with OPM records to track the travel movements of any government individual staying 
in a Marriott chain hotel—of which there are over 6,500 around the world including inside 
China.  146
 From a counterintelligence standpoint, China can track when two possible US 
intelligence members travel to the same hotel, possibly indicating a clandestine meetup. This 
would allow China to build a network map of intelligence members, their connections, and 
their movement patterns around the globe. They could place wiretaps in rooms where high 
interest individuals make reservations. They could also place their own Chinese foreign 
intelligence spies in the same hotel that a US individual with a security clearance is staying 
in. Using personal data from the OPM hack, that Chinese spy can then intercept the US 
individual and use human intelligence techniques to influence them to help the Chinese.    147
 The Marriott hacks were the first of its kind in a way. Up until that point, it was 
widely known that China was stealing data to give their own military and companies and 
edge over their competitors. However, the idea of China stealing personal data en masse from 
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businesses potentially for counterintelligence purposes is still a novel concept. The Marriott 
hacks were the first to indicate that this could be a potential Chinese tactic. As of the time of 
this writing, intelligence and security professionals are still identifying the potential 
vulnerabilities that this data poses to US government individuals. 
Raiding 
 Looking at both Russia’s and China’s cyber actions together, another concept that 
helps provide context to their cyber operations is the idea of “raiding.” As defined by 
geopolitical analyst Michael Kofman, “Raiding is the way by which Russia seeks to coerce 
the United States through a series of operations or campaigns that integrate indirect and 
direct approaches. Modern great power competition will thus return to forms of coercion and 
imposition reminiscent of the Middle Ages, but enacted with the technologies of today.”  148
 In other words, raiding is the term for the act of a weaker power to execute surprising, 
short, high impact operations against a more powerful actor that cumulatively achieve a 
strategic objective. Historically, raiding was a concept used throughout Europe by small 
groups fighting against their stronger neighbors or kingdoms. In comparison to large scale 
military actions, raiding utilizes agile, fail fast and fail cheap operations  consisting of quick 
execution. The Kofman continues, 
148 Kofman, Michael "Raiding and International Brigandry: Russia’s Strategy for Great 
Power Competition,” War on the Rocks, June 2018, https://warontherocks.com/2018/06/
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 “If war is not an option and direct competition is foolish in light of US advantages,  
 raiding is a viable alternative that could succeed over time. Therefore, Russia has   
 become the guerrilla in the international system, not seeking territorial dominion but  
 raiding to achieve its political objectives…If Moscow can remain a strategic thorn in  
 Washington’s side long enough for Beijing to become a global challenge to American  
 leadership, Washington may have no choice but to negotiate a new great power   
 condominium that ends the confrontation, or so Moscow hopes.”   149
 Historically, raiding is most effective against an opponent who possesses military 
overmatch but is distracted by a different threat. When traditional warfare is too costly, too 
risky, or unsuitable, raiding provides a concept within the gray zone for smaller individual 
operations to achieve, over time, a larger strategic goal. 
 Gray zone cyber operations are the modern day instruments of raiding. The idea of 
raids can be taken to help define the large number of small cyber operations that in and of 
themselves may not achieve much strategically but cumulatively have an impact—similar to 
the idea of death by a thousand cuts. China and Russia have conducted far too many cyber 
operations against not only the US, but other western state competitors to cover in within the 
scope of this thesis. However, when incorporating the idea of raiding, their individual 
operations can be viewed as achieving larger, organized strategic objectives that are slowly 
achieved through the many smaller attacks. When China’s and Russia’s cyber operations are 
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viewed as operations executed in concert, the two revisionist powers achieve more together 
to bring down the US unipolar hegemony of the post Cold War era. 
The Return of Nation-State Rivalry 
 In January of 2019 the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) issued the US 
Intelligence Community’s annual Worldwide Threat Assessment. The very first statement 
made in the assessment directly after the Foreword is: 
 “Our adversaries and strategic competitors will increasingly use cyber capabilities— 
 including cyber espionage, attack, and influence—to seek political, economic, and  
 military advantage over the United States and its allies and partners. China, Russia,  
 Iran, and North Korea increasingly use cyber operations to threaten both minds and  
 machines in an expanding number of ways—to steal information, to influence our  
 citizens, or to disrupt critical infrastructure.”  150
 The assessment then immediately discusses specifically the revisionist threat that 
China and Russia pose to the current world order. After cyber, the next threat discussed is 
online influence campaigns carried out against democratic processes. Terrorism and Islamic 
extremism take on a much smaller role in the article. This IC assessment makes it clear that 
150 Coats, Daniel (Director of National Security), “Statement for the Record: Worldwide 
Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,” Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence, (29 January, 2019).
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nation-state rivalry has replaced terrorism as the biggest threat to the United States and that 
the biggest tool or method of conducting this rivalry is through cyber means.  151
 It is an interesting point to note that the assessment discusses these threats not as 
something to be eliminated or prevented, but instead as a new standard and regular 
occurrence in international affairs.  This indicates that it is now commonly understood both 
throughout the Intelligence Community and international stage that state sponsored cyber 
attacks are not only commonplace, but physical retaliation against most types of attacks is 
unlikely. It is also understood that other forms of soft power retaliation such as indictments 
and sanctions are not expected to deter a state from conducting these attacks. The wording in 
this report confirms that revisionist powers have established a foreign policy TTP of turning 
to cyber operations when soft power actions are not achieving the desired national security or 
economic goal. This report has solidified the US belief that cyber operations are now the lead 
gray zone tool for states to achieve political objectives when traditional soft power tactics are 
not enough. 
151 Coats, Daniel (Director of National Security), “Statement for the Record: Worldwide 
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What Cyber can and Cannot Achieve 
 The threat assessment breaks out the cyber threats into three components: influence 
operations, cyber attacks that cause physical damage, and cyber espionage.  Both influence 152
operations and cyber espionage have already been discussed at length in this thesis. However, 
it is important to look at the potential and likelihood for cyber attacks to cause physical 
damage and the role that those types of attacks are predicted to play in this new inter-state 
competition.  
 The 2019 IC assessment states that both Russia and China are capable of disrupting 
critical infrastructure for a time period ranging from a few hours to several weeks. The 
assessment also states that Moscow specifically is mapping US infrastructure with the long 
term goal of causing substantial damage.  Additionally, experimental hackers at McAfee 153
have demonstrated various ways that IoT devices can be manipulated by malicious actors. 
Their experiments have utilized everything from smart TVs to vehicles to WiFi enabled lights 
and smart speakers—manipulating them to cause physical damage or even possible harm.  154
 That being said, expectations on what cyber operations can and cannot be expected to 
achieve should be made. It is true that revisionist powers have advanced to a point where 
152 Coats, Daniel (Director of National Security), “Statement for the Record: Worldwide 
Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,” Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence, (29 January, 2019).
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they can do physical damage to infrastructure purely through computer network 
manipulation. In fact, McAfee’s experiments show that even a lone actor can cause physical 
damage through cyber means.  However, these types of attacks are not the most likely 155
future course of action for revisionist states conducting cyber operations. While cyber attacks 
are now commonplace, physical effects on the level of Stuxnet will still be the exception 
rather than the norm. 
 If states have the power to deal physical, violent damage to their opponents through 
cyber means, why would they avoid doing so? This is because cyber operations are most 
beneficial when used within the realm of the gray zone. The benefit of a cyber attack is that it 
is capable of temporarily disrupting critical infrastructure specifically without causing the 
same level of permanent destruction as a conventional military attack. This temporary 
disruption is something that physical attacks cannot do. Gray zone tools achieve political 
objectives specifically without having to resort to physical conflict. The goal of a gray zone 
tool is not to cause destruction to a state that is on the scale of a war, neither is it to provide a 
new way to wage traditional war. Rather, if a state wants to realize the full potential of gray 
zone cyber operations, they should be trying to achieve political objectives with the least 
amount of destruction possible in order to avoid an escalation. If State A wants to cause 
confusion by cutting off the communications of State B and the former has the cyber 
capability to either temporarily disrupt comms or use cyber to physically destroy 
155 Siskind, Geoff "Hackable Podcast by McAfee,” McAfee, February 2019, https://
hackablepodcast.com/.
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communications infrastructure, why risk the fallout of physical destruction when temporary 
disruption achieves the same purpose?  
 This is the primary reason that large scale attacks on physical infrastructure—while 
possible and may even occur from time to time—will remain much rarer than other forms of 
cyber operations and will likely only occur within a highly limited scope—such as in the 
Stuxnet and the attack seen in the Ukraine conflict. Conducting violent attacks that result in 
permanent damage to a state is—in most cases— counterproductive to the reason a state 
would be using a cyber attack in the first place.  
 The collateral damage risk is another reason a state would want to avoid conducting 
large scale, physically damaging attacks. Because of how interconnected networked systems 
are by nature, it is often difficult to estimate the amount of collateral damage done when a 
cyber attack is executed. This is less of an issue when the cyber operation only results in 
temporary disruption—if systems that are not the original target suffer temporarily, that may 
be an acceptable risk. However, if the attack is designed to cause permanent damage or even 
death, the risk of the attack spilling over to a system that is not the intended target may be too 
great for a state to risk. At that point, it would be more reasonable for a state to conduct the 
attack via precision physical weapons because the collateral damage is more controllable. If a 
political objective requires the use of violent action or death, it would be more effectively 
executed using conventional methods because—if an attack results in violence or death—
escalation in retaliation may occur anyway, regardless of attack vector. 
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 In conclusion, cyber operations are effective as a political tool in solving geopolitical 
challenges and goals where escalation to physical conflict is not desired. This desire for 
avoiding physical conflict helps provide a restraint to what type of cyber operations will be 
conducted. Just because a cyber attack “could” achieve a certain effect does not mean it 
“should” be used that way. The best use of cyber capabilities depends on the geopolitical goal 
trying to be achieved by its use. Both Russia and China have the technical capability to do 
physical, catastrophic harm through cyber attacks,  but that would defeat the purpose and 156
many of the benefits of cyber tools over traditional hard power.  
156 Coats, Daniel (Director of National Security), “Statement for the Record: Worldwide 
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CONCLUSION 
 With the return of nation-state rivalry, cyber operations provide a variety of options in 
influencing competitors when soft power actions are not enough or not desired. As networked 
connectivity further saturates every corner of the globe and every aspect of daily interactions, 
cyber attacks will become just as normal in the international sphere as economic 
negotiations, sanctions, and other everyday soft power moves. However, these gray zone 
cyber acts will deliberately be executed in such a manner as to avoid armed retaliation  or 
lethality, thus limiting the scope and damage of cyber operations. Information warfare, 
influence operations, espionage, theft, and temporary infrastructure disruption are just a few 
of the new tools for states as revisionist powers look for new methods to gain objectives in 
the coming decades.   
 Contrary to many, networked technology does not make geography and state borders 
irrelevant. Rather, technological capabilities are bounded by geopolitics.  Geography, 157
borders (such as waterways and mountain ranges), and natural resources still shape the 
strategic goals of a state and therefore shape how cyber is best used a tool. Despite all the 
unique benefits that cyber operations provide to a revisionist state and the regularity at which 
they will occur in the future, their geopolitical goals will define when and what type of cyber 
operations are the best tool to use.  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